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Date: Mon, 13 Apr 2015 08:43:06 -0700
From: Jim Manico <>
Subject: Re: [PHC] winner selection

Why only have one winner? Why not choose several winners with various 
trade-offs based on need?

Jim Manico

On 4/13/15 8:35 AM, Gregory Maxwell wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 13, 2015 at 3:11 PM, Solar Designer <> wrote:
>> Makwa - likely select as a winner, but may need more pairs of eyes
>> first, who would confirm they have actually reviewed Makwa.  I think
>> Steve did?  Anyone else?  I didn't review it, and I think we have panel
>> members who are more qualified to review it.  Makwa is a likely winner
>> because it provides a unique feature with specific use cases for it,
>> it looks good at first glance (but indeed that's not a proper review),
>> and it comes from a particularly careful submitter.
> Malkwa is near to my heart-- having a class of approach that I'm fond
> of, but I think it would only be selected as a winner because it is
> the only function of its type in the contest.
> If I'd offered a Malkwa competitor it would have had information
> theoretic security for delegation (in exchange for making some
> tricks/performance worse). I suspect in the Bitcoin space we may
> someday deploy something like Malkwa for some applications (in
> particular; access keys for hardware wallets that don't have enough
> computational power to perform meaningful hardening on their own), but
> we'd only prefer it over more ordinary hardening functions if it
> bought us information theoretic security, which allow worryfree
> delegation of computation to completely untrusted parties.

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