phc-discussions - Re: [PHC] Maximising Pseudo-Entropy versus resistance to Side-Channel Attacks

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite for Android: free password hash cracker in your pocket

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <1439325270.20150504204126@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 4 May 2015 20:41:26 +0200
From: Krisztián Pintér <pinterkr@...il.com>
To: discussions@...sword-hashing.net
Subject: Re: [PHC] Maximising Pseudo-Entropy versus resistance to Side-Channel Attacks


Solar Designer (at Monday, May 4, 2015, 7:52:19 PM):

> The hashing scheme has to be specifically
> designed such that "as long as the salts are not known/predictable by
> the attacker", it is immune to side-channel attacks.  And ideally this
> should be easy to see.  I think in (ye)scrypt it is easy to see (even
> though in scrypt this probably wasn't a deliberate design goal).

and since there is no 100% side channel proof algorithm, we should
demand this property from all hashes.

submission version gambit was not protected. current version is, since
i implemented the crypto module approach. and i just now recalled that
the lecture that inspired me to do that is exactly about this.

find here http://video.adm.ntnu.no/pres/54980a597dfaf

Sweta Mishra (rig team) - Cryptographic module based approach for
password hashing schemes