phc-discussions - Re: [PHC] Maximising Pseudo-Entropy versus resistance to Side-Channel Attacks

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite for Android: free password hash cracker in your pocket

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <alpine.DEB.2.11.1505041906250.2010@debian>
Date: Mon, 4 May 2015 19:08:22 +0200 (CEST)
From: Stefan.Lucks@...-weimar.de
To: discussions@...sword-hashing.net
Subject: Re: [PHC] Maximising Pseudo-Entropy versus resistance to Side-Channel
 Attacks

On Mon, 4 May 2015, Solar Designer wrote:

> Now our options are: use solely hashes and comparison functions that are
> side-channel safe(*) even without cryptographically random salts, or/and
> require cryptographically random salts.  The latter hardens existing
> software too - such as uses of strcmp() on password hashes in lots of
> existing software.

Not at all. Don't require cryptographically random salts, but try to 
generate them nevertheless. ;-)

THAT harends existing software too.

This is the counterpart to requiring cryptographically random salts 
without actually generating them -- which would weaken your sovtware.

So long

Stefan

------  I  love  the  taste  of  Cryptanalysis  in  the morning!  ------
uni-weimar.de/de/medien/professuren/mediensicherheit/people/stefan-lucks
--Stefan.Lucks (at) uni-weimar.de, Bauhaus-Universität Weimar, Germany--