phc-discussions - Re: [PHC] Why protect against side channel attacks

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Message-ID: <CAOLP8p6jvFZ2H=fAX3j0iJg+8FSk1YcLG6fXQxPinz+Qg8vGQw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Jun 2015 18:18:13 -0700
From: Bill Cox <waywardgeek@...il.com>
To: "discussions@...sword-hashing.net" <discussions@...sword-hashing.net>
Subject: Re: [PHC] Why protect against side channel attacks

On Wed, Jun 24, 2015 at 5:55 PM, Marsh Ray <maray@...rosoft.com> wrote:

>  Again, these cache timing side channels tend to leak the salts too.
>

How?  In most cases, salt never leaves the authentication servers and
associated storage.  The salt is hashed/shredded before unpredictable
addressing begins.

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