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Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2015 03:33:24 +0100
From: Peter Maxwell <>
To: "" <>
Subject: Re: [PHC] Why protect against side channel attacks

On 25 June 2015 at 02:45, Marsh Ray <> wrote:
> I don’t recall if the PHC analysis considered this question explicitly for
> those functions with password-derived access patterns.
> It’s probably a moot point for a couple of reasons:
> * It doesn’t sound like we’re actually contemplating a function with a
> password-derived access pattern side channel, and

​Are there any candidates that use the password, or password derived data,
at any point to derive the memory access pattern?  For example, does the
password get mixed-in in any way and then the result used to determine the
memory access pattern?

​If the memory access pattern is completely invariant of the password then
I don't see a problem.

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