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Message-ID: <CA+hr98E4aB4QhxntWSSGiW9xvX0sZ9+ZMrh1gZh93YxiLXGTEg@mail.gmail.com> Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2015 17:26:42 +0200 From: Krisztián Pintér <pinterkr@...il.com> To: "discussions@...sword-hashing.net" <discussions@...sword-hashing.net> Subject: Re: [PHC] Why protect against side channel attacks one more point in your scenario, client gets h(pwd, salt) if side channel can reveal the data entirely, i steal this value. then i initiate login attempt, i send password "crap", get back a wrong h("crap", salt), then i just ignore this, and stretch the recovered h(pwd, salt) instead. boom, i'm logged in, without even knowing the correct password. > I'm just feeling that some of these arguments against cache-dependent candidates i'm not aware of more than one argument: possible leakage
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