lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
Hash Suite for Android: free password hash cracker in your pocket
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2015 17:26:42 +0200
From: Krisztián Pintér <>
To: "" <>
Subject: Re: [PHC] Why protect against side channel attacks

one more point

in your scenario, client gets h(pwd, salt)

if side channel can reveal the data entirely, i steal this value.

then i initiate login attempt, i send password "crap", get back a
wrong h("crap", salt), then i just ignore this, and stretch the
recovered h(pwd, salt) instead. boom, i'm logged in, without even
knowing the correct password.

> I'm just feeling that some of these arguments against cache-dependent candidates

i'm not aware of more than one argument: possible leakage

Powered by blists - more mailing lists