phc-discussions - RE: [PHC] Why protect against side channel attacks

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Message-ID: <35d101d0af8a$c4fa25a0$4eee70e0$@bindshell.nl>
Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2015 14:06:13 -0700
From: <epixoip@...dshell.nl>
To: <discussions@...sword-hashing.net>
Subject: RE: [PHC] Why protect against side channel attacks

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Krisztián Pintér [mailto:pinterkr@...il.com]
> Sent: Thursday, June 25, 2015 06:59
> To: discussions@...sword-hashing.net
> Subject: Re: [PHC] Why protect against side channel attacks
> 
> On Thu, Jun 25, 2015 at 3:17 PM, Ben Harris <mail@...rr.is> wrote:
> > But no, the salt is better considered as "sensitive" and treated in the same
> > respect as the password hash.
> 
> secret salt disables server relief


This isn't necessarily true (or at least doesn't have to be true.) Salt with the username for the client-side hashing, then hash with a "traditional" salt on the server-side before storing the final hash in the password database. This is precisely what LastPass does.