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Message-ID: <CAOLP8p6RdjO8sHEr408bkO+A46PiFq8_=jooD_UzNPRXLgt3zw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 4 Jul 2015 11:22:03 -0700
From: Bill Cox <waywardgeek@...il.com>
To: "discussions@...sword-hashing.net" <discussions@...sword-hashing.net>
Subject: Re: [PHC] Memory-hard proof of work with fast verification (CPU Hash)

On Sat, Jul 4, 2015 at 9:06 AM, Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com> wrote:

> On Sat, Jul 04, 2015 at 03:56:57AM -0700, Bill Cox wrote:
> > random ROM (maybe 512MiB), and a fairly small RAM (20KiB).
> [...]
> > Defeating GPU attacks is with the large ROM.  Scrypt achieves parity
> > somewhere around 4MiB.  This would be much larger, maybe 512MiB.
>
> We shouldn't compare RAM vs. ROM sizes like that.  RAM is per instance,
> ROM is shared.  Having a 512 MB ROM will, on its own, have only small
> impact on performance on modern GPU cards.  For example, on a card with 4
> GB RAM, it leaves 3.5 GB for the instances' "RAMs", thereby
> reducing concurrency to 7/8 of what would be possible without a ROM.

The expected performance is thus somewhere in the range of 7/8 to 1 of
> what it would have been without a ROM.
>

Why is shared access to ROM where each process needs to read random blocks
from ROM faster than shared access to read/write RAM?  Aren't both I/O
bandwidth limited?  Why would RAM bandwidth be lower?

The ROM block hash needs to be fast to fill the memory bandwidth.  I would
use a 2-round Yescrypt hash (or something even faster) in this case.  Small
rapid unpredictable read/writes to the small RAM are also needed to defeat
today's GPUs, but Yescrypt already has this.

Against ASICs, the memory bandwidth and compute time hardening will be the
main limiting factors, I think.  I see no difference between using a large
ROM with a small RAM vs just a large RAM in an ASIC attack.  Both are
probably going to be memory bandwidth limited, and read speeds are
comparable to write speeds.  Am I missing something?

To defeat GPUs via a large ROM, you need to make it larger than the GPU
> cards' RAM sizes, so some ROM accesses will have to go over PCIe
> (transferring ROM blocks from other GPU cards' RAM or from host's RAM).
>

That's one way, but it means most laptops and cheap desktops will not be
useful for mining.  Basically, our CPUs are already paid for, as are a lot
of our GPU cards.  To make CPU based mining useful, we need the power
consumption per hash to be on par with the power consumed in the GPU.  My
GPU sucks down 350W, more than my CPU.  It is not clear to me whether GPUs
are significantly more power efficient when the speed limiting factor is
graphics memory bandwidth.  With Yescrypt's further GPU defense, I think it
would be fine.


> And yes, someone might want to introduce a cryptocoin based on yescrypt
> with ROM enabled.  Maybe its ROM size should even grow over time, e.g.
> starting at 28 GB (4 GB higher than what current top GPU cards use, and
> 4 GB lower than what fits in current desktop systems) and doubling every
> few years or something... and eventually this might favor HPC clusters
> with fast interconnect or something.
>

The very large ROM has a big advantage in that defends against botnets.  I
think botnets are one of the scariest attack vectors against
crypto-currencies.  However, I'm not currently attempting to defeat
botnets.  I'm trying to enable regular laptop based mining.

Currently, the fastest interconnect solution for bandwidth/dollar I can
find are using Achronix FPGAs.  The bandwidth is amazing.  However, you
can't get the data out of the DRAM banks any faster than DRAM regular
speed.  Even if the network delay was zero, and even if it cost zero, I
don't see how to build a network of distributed ROM nodes where there is
enough benefit to an attacker to bother.  He's still ROM port bandwidth
limited, which is no faster than if he were RAM port limited.  After all,
they're probably the same chips.  The only difference is the ROM case is
all reads, while the RAM case has writes.

What am I missing?

Bill

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