phc-discussions - Re: [PHC] hash encryption

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Message-ID: <56F2FD93.2030500@dei.uc.pt>
Date: Wed, 23 Mar 2016 20:33:23 +0000
From: Samuel Neves <sneves@....uc.pt>
To: discussions@...sword-hashing.net
Subject: Re: [PHC] hash encryption

On 03/23/2016 04:10 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> Alternatively, sticking with primitives already in (ye)scrypt, one can reuse the underlying permutation of Salsa20 to
>> > turn it into an Even-Mansour block cipher---P(block xor key) xor key.
>> >
> A while ago, I looked, and it seemed like all the security analysis of
> the Salsa20 permutation assumed that a bunch of the input words to the
> core permutation were fixed.  In the Even-Mansour scheme, they would
> be under strong attacker control.  Did I miss something?

No; I was thinking of ChaCha20, which is better behaved, when writing the above. I withdraw the suggestion.