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Message-Id: <D575985A-8DC7-4DE6-AF43-98BFF33E400B@codingrobots.com> Date: Thu, 24 Mar 2016 13:15:22 +0100 From: Dmitry Chestnykh <dmitry@...ingrobots.com> To: discussions@...sword-hashing.net Subject: Re: [PHC] hash encryption > Thinking of it some more, the exception may actually be important, still > allowing to attack the last 1 or 2 rounds. So my proposed change isn't > as complete a mitigation as hashing in the key length would be. What about starting a round counter (which gets hashed) from a different, non-overlapping, value for different key sizes? 128-bit key: round# = 0, 1, 2, 3 256-bit key: round# = 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 -- Dmitry Chestnykh Coding Robots http://www.codingrobots.com
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