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Date: Sat, 2 Apr 2016 04:27:19 +0300
From: Solar Designer <>
Subject: Re: [PHC] hash encryption

On Thu, Mar 24, 2016 at 10:46:07PM +0300, Solar Designer wrote:
> I am considering side-stepping the issue: instead of arbitrary {key,
> keylen}, accept only an exactly 32-byte key.  If an application wants to
> use a human-friendly string, it will need to derive the key first, such
> as with another invocation of yescrypt, which is what would have been
> recommended anyway.  This should work great for network services
> implemented as persistent processes,

This is what I implemented now, including a revision of yescrypt
(accepting the optional encryption key; otherwise compatible with what
we had before) and a persistent network service using it.

Also, I fixed the number of rounds at 7, for simplicity and since it's
not known how good or not the source material for the key was.  At this
setting, the performance overhead is around 0.2% at 2 MB (which is
nearly the smallest m_cost relevant for such use), and less than that at
higher m_cost.

I've attached the revised encryption code.

There's also a new API call:

 * yescrypt_reencrypt(hash, from_key, to_key):
 * Re-encrypt a yescrypt hash from one key to another.  Either key may be NULL
 * to indicate unencrypted hash.  The encoded hash string is modified in-place.
 * Return the hash pointer on success; or NULL on error (in which case the hash
 * string is left unmodified).
 * MT-safe as long as hash is local to the thread.
extern uint8_t * yescrypt_reencrypt(uint8_t * __hash,
    const yescrypt_binary_t * __from_key,
    const yescrypt_binary_t * __to_key);

As discussed, uint8_t will need to change to "unsigned char", or for
hash encodings, which use 7-bit chars only, possibly to "char" for ease
of use along with <string.h> functions (which generally want "char" and
result in warnings on "unsigned char").

> but maybe not so great for typical
> web apps in PHP, where it might hamper adoption of this feature (will
> need either persistent storage of the derived key or repeated key
> derivation in each new process).  So I am still undecided.

There's another option: provide a fast KDF specifically for such use
(perhaps just HMAC with a personalization string), and clearly document
that its input key must be high-entropy.


View attachment "sim-encrypt.c" of type "text/x-c" (1220 bytes)

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