full-disclosure - Re: GUNINSKI THE SELF-PROMOTER

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From: Valdis.Kletnieks at vt.edu (Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu)
Subject: Re: GUNINSKI THE SELF-PROMOTER 

On Tue, 15 Jul 2003 08:02:56 EDT, "Richard M. Smith" <rms@...puterbytesman.com>  said:
> Ah yes, the Good Time virus.  What a silly idea that a virus can execute
> simply by reading an email message.  Everyone knows that's
> impossible........

Actually, that's *STILL* impossible.  As far as I am aware of, every single
"attack when you open the message" virus/worm is dependent on the fact that
certain mail programs confuse the concept of "reading the message text" and
"executing/interpreting code provided by an attacker". (OK - there's a mostly
theoretical attack overflowing a buffer or something in a 'more/less' type
program, and admittedly there's some borderline cases like the MIME header
overflow documented in CERT CA-1998-10).

Hint - think about why you need different security zones to defend you against
plain non-active text.  Those zones are only there because there's *ACTIVE*
content involved.

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