full-disclosure - Re: Re: Any update on SSH brute force attempts?

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From: barrie at reboot-robot.net (Barrie Dempster)
Subject: Re: Re: Any update on SSH brute force
	attempts?

On Mon, 2004-10-18 at 14:01 +0100, Dave Ewart wrote:
> Well yes, that's fair enough - however, allowing direct root access does
> make certain things more straightforward, automated use of 'scp' etc.

Yeh, but theres only a select few people crazy enough to scp files into
places that require root access.

People that fall into the more sane side of security use less error
prone methods of updating configurations (which is what I'm guessing
your using scp here for). There are very few valid reasons to have
direct remote root access (so few I can't currently think of a one)
remote admin tasks can be carried out by means other than login in
directly as root.

-- 
Barrie Dempster (zeedo) - Fortiter et Strenue

  http://www.bsrf.org.uk

[ gpg --recv-keys --keyserver www.keyserver.net 0x96025FD0 ]
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