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Date: Tue, 25 Sep 2007 09:39:29 -0400
From: "J. Oquendo" <sil@...iltrated.net>
To: Crispin Cowan <crispin@...ell.com>
Cc: Chad Perrin <perrin@...theon.com>,
	"pdp \(architect\)" <pdp.gnucitizen@...glemail.com>,
	Gadi Evron <ge@...uxbox.org>, Casper.Dik@....COM,
	full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk, bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: Re: 0day: PDF pwns Windows

Crispin Cowan wrote:

>
> This is a perfectly viable way to produce what amounts to Internet
> munitions. The recent incident of Estonia Under *Russian Cyber Attack*?
> <http://www.internetnews.com/security/article.php/3678606> is an example
> of such a network brush war in which possession of such an arsenal would
> be very useful.
>
> Crispin

One would presume that governments across the world would have their
shares of unpublished exploits but with all the incidences of government
networks being compromised, I don't believe this to be the case. What
happened in Estonia though was nothing more than a botnet attack on
their infrastructure
(http://www.informationweek.com/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=199602023)
not an 0day attack.

0day's defined as "unpublished exploit" wouldn't do much in a
cyberwarfare theater as country against country as the purpose of such
warfare would LIKELY be to disconnect/disrupt communications. In the
cases of industrial/country vs. country espionage it might (likely) will
 be more effective for the long haul but in the short term, 0days will
be useless in this type of "cyberfight". Think about it logically, you
want to "disrupt" country X's communications, not tap them. You'd want
to make sure their physical army had no mechanism to communicate. You'd
want to make sure financially you would cripple them. Not worry about
injecting some crapware onto a machine for the sake of seeing what their
doing.

Reconnaissance is usually something done beforehand to mitigate your
strategy. Not mitigate what's happening after you possibly sent 1Gb of
traffic down a 100Mb pipe.



-- 
====================================================
J. Oquendo
"Excusatio non petita, accusatio manifesta"

http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xF684C42E
sil . infiltrated @ net http://www.infiltrated.net


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