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Date: Sat, 18 Jan 2014 19:40:09 +0900
From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>
To: miklos@...redi.hu, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Cc: torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, hch@...radead.org,
akpm@...ux-foundation.org, dhowells@...hat.com, zab@...hat.com,
jack@...e.cz, luto@...capital.net, mszeredi@...e.cz
Subject: Re: [PATCH 04/11] vfs: add renameat2 syscall
Miklos Szeredi wrote:
> Since there were a few changes to the series since posting, I pushed the updated
> patchset to
>
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mszeredi/vfs.git cross-rename
>
> Thanks for the reviews.
>
> Thanks,
> Miklos
> ----
>
> Miklos Szeredi (11):
> vfs: add d_is_dir()
> vfs: rename: move d_move() up
> vfs: rename: use common code for dir and non-dir
> vfs: add renameat2 syscall
> vfs: add RENAME_NOREPLACE flag
> security: add flags to rename hooks
> vfs: add cross-rename
> ext4: rename: create ext4_renament structure for local vars
> ext4: rename: move EMLINK check up
> ext4: rename: split out helper functions
> ext4: add cross rename support
Here is a patchset refreshed using the abovementioned tree
for handling the rename flags in each LSM module.
SELinux: Added a few lines.
SMACK: No changes needed.
TOMOYO: Added some lines in order to check swapname permission once
rather than checking rename permission twice.
AppArmor: Using a temporary solution. John Johansen will overwrite this
change in order to avoid re-calculation of pathnames.
LSM users, please review your relevant part in the following changes.
----------------------------------------
>>From 15850773c7b6336f1d884c2daa314f4c408d355e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Date: Sat, 18 Jan 2014 14:01:12 +0900
Subject: [PATCH 1/5] LSM: Pass the rename flags to each LSM module.
For now, security_inode_rename() and security_path_rename() are calling each
LSM module with reversed arguments if the rename flags contain RENAME_EXCHANGE
in order to avoid bypassing LSM module's permission checks. But since LSM
modules can avoid re-calculation if the arguments are known to be reversed,
it is better to pass the rename flags anyway.
security_inode_rename() and security_path_rename() will stop calling each LSM
module with reversed arguments after all LSM modules became ready to handle
the rename flags.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>
---
include/linux/security.h | 8 ++++++--
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 3 ++-
security/capability.c | 6 ++++--
security/security.c | 10 ++++++----
security/selinux/hooks.c | 3 ++-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 4 +++-
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 4 +++-
7 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 95cfccc..dbd05ca 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -446,6 +446,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
* @old_dentry contains the dentry structure of the old link.
* @new_dir contains the inode structure for parent of the new link.
* @new_dentry contains the dentry structure of the new link.
+ * @flags contains rename flags.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
* @path_rename:
* Check for permission to rename a file or directory.
@@ -453,6 +454,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
* @old_dentry contains the dentry structure of the old link.
* @new_dir contains the path structure for parent of the new link.
* @new_dentry contains the dentry structure of the new link.
+ * @flags contains rename flags.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
* @path_chmod:
* Check for permission to change DAC's permission of a file or directory.
@@ -1491,7 +1493,8 @@ struct security_operations {
int (*path_link) (struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
struct dentry *new_dentry);
int (*path_rename) (struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
- struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry);
+ struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry,
+ unsigned int flags);
int (*path_chmod) (struct path *path, umode_t mode);
int (*path_chown) (struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid);
int (*path_chroot) (struct path *path);
@@ -1514,7 +1517,8 @@ struct security_operations {
int (*inode_mknod) (struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
umode_t mode, dev_t dev);
int (*inode_rename) (struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
- struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry);
+ struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry,
+ unsigned int flags);
int (*inode_readlink) (struct dentry *dentry);
int (*inode_follow_link) (struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd);
int (*inode_permission) (struct inode *inode, int mask);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 4257b7e..2afa7c5 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -315,7 +315,8 @@ static int apparmor_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
}
static int apparmor_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
- struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
+ struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry,
+ unsigned int flags)
{
struct aa_profile *profile;
int error = 0;
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 8b4f24a..ab2f231 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -176,7 +176,8 @@ static int cap_inode_mknod(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
}
static int cap_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
- struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
+ struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry,
+ unsigned int flags)
{
return 0;
}
@@ -280,7 +281,8 @@ static int cap_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
}
static int cap_path_rename(struct path *old_path, struct dentry *old_dentry,
- struct path *new_path, struct dentry *new_dentry)
+ struct path *new_path, struct dentry *new_dentry,
+ unsigned int flags)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 3dd2258..d720afc 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -442,13 +442,14 @@ int security_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) {
int err = security_ops->path_rename(new_dir, new_dentry,
- old_dir, old_dentry);
+ old_dir, old_dentry,
+ flags);
if (err)
return err;
}
return security_ops->path_rename(old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir,
- new_dentry);
+ new_dentry, flags);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_rename);
@@ -542,13 +543,14 @@ int security_inode_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) {
int err = security_ops->inode_rename(new_dir, new_dentry,
- old_dir, old_dentry);
+ old_dir, old_dentry,
+ flags);
if (err)
return err;
}
return security_ops->inode_rename(old_dir, old_dentry,
- new_dir, new_dentry);
+ new_dir, new_dentry, flags);
}
int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 57b0b49..c139369 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2731,7 +2731,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t
}
static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
- struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
+ struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry,
+ unsigned int flags)
{
return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
}
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index b0be893..1cbb73b 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -722,6 +722,7 @@ static int smack_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
* @old_dentry: unused
* @new_inode: the new directory
* @new_dentry: unused
+ * @flags: unused
*
* Read and write access is required on both the old and
* new directories.
@@ -731,7 +732,8 @@ static int smack_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
struct dentry *old_dentry,
struct inode *new_inode,
- struct dentry *new_dentry)
+ struct dentry *new_dentry,
+ unsigned int flags)
{
int rc;
char *isp;
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
index f0b756e..ac7dd97 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -287,13 +287,15 @@ static int tomoyo_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
* @old_dentry: Pointer to "struct dentry".
* @new_parent: Pointer to "struct path".
* @new_dentry: Pointer to "struct dentry".
+ * @flags: Rename flags.
*
* Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
*/
static int tomoyo_path_rename(struct path *old_parent,
struct dentry *old_dentry,
struct path *new_parent,
- struct dentry *new_dentry)
+ struct dentry *new_dentry,
+ unsigned int flags)
{
struct path path1 = { old_parent->mnt, old_dentry };
struct path path2 = { new_parent->mnt, new_dentry };
--
1.7.1
----------------------------------------
>>From 3b109949884ef534cbe0f8ddb9115422fd75b67d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Date: Sat, 18 Jan 2014 14:25:39 +0900
Subject: [PATCH 2/5] SELinux: Handle the rename flags.
For SELinux, the RENAME_EXCHANGE flag means "check permissions with reversed
arguments".
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 5 ++++-
1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index c139369..a6ef610 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2734,7 +2734,10 @@ static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dent
struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry,
unsigned int flags)
{
- return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
+ int err = may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
+ if (!err && (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE))
+ err = may_rename(new_inode, new_dentry, old_inode, old_dentry);
+ return err;
}
static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
--
1.7.1
----------------------------------------
>>From d0e400cf5e134cf8b6d06dc6b9c15fa6e6ca007e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Date: Sat, 18 Jan 2014 14:30:51 +0900
Subject: [PATCH 3/5] AppArmor: Handle the rename flags.
For AppArmor, the RENAME_EXCHANGE flag means "check permissions with reversed
arguments". Future patches will stop re-calculating pathnames.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>
---
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 12 ++++++++++++
1 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 2afa7c5..8b04056 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -332,6 +332,7 @@ static int apparmor_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode
};
+retry:
error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, profile, &old_path, 0,
MAY_READ | AA_MAY_META_READ | MAY_WRITE |
AA_MAY_META_WRITE | AA_MAY_DELETE,
@@ -340,6 +341,17 @@ static int apparmor_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, profile, &new_path,
0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE |
AA_MAY_CREATE, &cond);
+ if (!error && (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE)) {
+ /* Cross rename requires both inodes to exist. */
+ old_path.mnt = new_dir->mnt;
+ old_path.dentry = new_dentry;
+ new_path.mnt = old_dir->mnt;
+ new_path.dentry = old_dentry;
+ cond.uid = new_dentry->d_inode->i_uid;
+ cond.mode = new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode;
+ flags = 0;
+ goto retry;
+ }
}
return error;
--
1.7.1
----------------------------------------
>>From 76fbf677b730070ee7eb2296ef4c38fa288b1bbd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Date: Sat, 18 Jan 2014 16:45:53 +0900
Subject: [PATCH 4/5] TOMOYO: Handle the rename flags.
For TOMOYO, the RENAME_EXCHANGE flag means "check swapname permission once
rather than checking rename permission twice". This patch adds swapname
permission to TOMOYO.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>
---
security/tomoyo/common.c | 1 +
security/tomoyo/common.h | 5 ++++-
security/tomoyo/file.c | 10 +++++++++-
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 4 +++-
security/tomoyo/util.c | 1 +
5 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.c b/security/tomoyo/common.c
index 283862a..86747a7 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.c
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ const char * const tomoyo_mac_keywords[TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_INDEX
[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MKCHAR] = "mkchar",
[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_LINK] = "link",
[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_RENAME] = "rename",
+ [TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_SWAPNAME] = "swapname",
[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_CHMOD] = "chmod",
[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_CHOWN] = "chown",
[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_CHGRP] = "chgrp",
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.h b/security/tomoyo/common.h
index b897d48..0349ae9 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.h
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.h
@@ -276,6 +276,7 @@ enum tomoyo_network_acl_index {
enum tomoyo_path2_acl_index {
TOMOYO_TYPE_LINK,
TOMOYO_TYPE_RENAME,
+ TOMOYO_TYPE_SWAPNAME,
TOMOYO_TYPE_PIVOT_ROOT,
TOMOYO_MAX_PATH2_OPERATION
};
@@ -335,6 +336,7 @@ enum tomoyo_mac_index {
TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MKCHAR,
TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_LINK,
TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_RENAME,
+ TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_SWAPNAME,
TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_CHMOD,
TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_CHOWN,
TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_CHGRP,
@@ -730,7 +732,8 @@ struct tomoyo_mkdev_acl {
};
/*
- * Structure for "file rename", "file link" and "file pivot_root" directive.
+ * Structure for "file rename", "file swapname", "file link" and
+ * "file pivot_root" directive.
*/
struct tomoyo_path2_acl {
struct tomoyo_acl_info head; /* type = TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH2_ACL */
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/file.c b/security/tomoyo/file.c
index 4003907..c7d9546 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/file.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/file.c
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ const u8 tomoyo_pnnn2mac[TOMOYO_MAX_MKDEV_OPERATION] = {
const u8 tomoyo_pp2mac[TOMOYO_MAX_PATH2_OPERATION] = {
[TOMOYO_TYPE_LINK] = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_LINK,
[TOMOYO_TYPE_RENAME] = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_RENAME,
+ [TOMOYO_TYPE_SWAPNAME] = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_SWAPNAME,
[TOMOYO_TYPE_PIVOT_ROOT] = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_PIVOT_ROOT,
};
@@ -874,7 +875,7 @@ int tomoyo_mkdev_perm(const u8 operation, struct path *path,
}
/**
- * tomoyo_path2_perm - Check permission for "rename", "link" and "pivot_root".
+ * tomoyo_path2_perm - Check permission for "rename", "swapname", "link" and "pivot_root".
*
* @operation: Type of operation.
* @path1: Pointer to "struct path".
@@ -916,6 +917,13 @@ int tomoyo_path2_perm(const u8 operation, struct path *path1,
tomoyo_add_slash(&buf1);
tomoyo_add_slash(&buf2);
break;
+ case TOMOYO_TYPE_SWAPNAME:
+ /* Cross rename requires both inodes to exist. */
+ if (S_ISDIR(path1->dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
+ tomoyo_add_slash(&buf1);
+ if (S_ISDIR(path2->dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
+ tomoyo_add_slash(&buf2);
+ break;
}
r.obj = &obj;
r.param_type = TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH2_ACL;
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
index ac7dd97..8e9fb4a 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -299,7 +299,9 @@ static int tomoyo_path_rename(struct path *old_parent,
{
struct path path1 = { old_parent->mnt, old_dentry };
struct path path2 = { new_parent->mnt, new_dentry };
- return tomoyo_path2_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_RENAME, &path1, &path2);
+ return tomoyo_path2_perm((flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) ?
+ TOMOYO_TYPE_SWAPNAME : TOMOYO_TYPE_RENAME,
+ &path1, &path2);
}
/**
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/util.c b/security/tomoyo/util.c
index 2952ba5..f0ac0be 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/util.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/util.c
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ const u8 tomoyo_index2category[TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_INDEX] = {
[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MKCHAR] = TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_FILE,
[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_LINK] = TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_FILE,
[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_RENAME] = TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_FILE,
+ [TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_SWAPNAME] = TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_FILE,
[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_CHMOD] = TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_FILE,
[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_CHOWN] = TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_FILE,
[TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_CHGRP] = TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_FILE,
--
1.7.1
----------------------------------------
>>From 9b135d4223002f9d193066b1908a6de976238e6d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Date: Sat, 18 Jan 2014 16:52:06 +0900
Subject: [PATCH 5/5] LSM: Remove duplicated rename handling.
Since all LSM modules are now ready to handle the rename flags,
security_inode_rename() and security_path_rename() no longer need to call
each LSM module with reversed arguments.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>
---
security/security.c | 18 ------------------
1 files changed, 0 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index d720afc..9258353 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -439,15 +439,6 @@ int security_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(old_dentry->d_inode) ||
(new_dentry->d_inode && IS_PRIVATE(new_dentry->d_inode))))
return 0;
-
- if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) {
- int err = security_ops->path_rename(new_dir, new_dentry,
- old_dir, old_dentry,
- flags);
- if (err)
- return err;
- }
-
return security_ops->path_rename(old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir,
new_dentry, flags);
}
@@ -540,15 +531,6 @@ int security_inode_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(old_dentry->d_inode) ||
(new_dentry->d_inode && IS_PRIVATE(new_dentry->d_inode))))
return 0;
-
- if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) {
- int err = security_ops->inode_rename(new_dir, new_dentry,
- old_dir, old_dentry,
- flags);
- if (err)
- return err;
- }
-
return security_ops->inode_rename(old_dir, old_dentry,
new_dir, new_dentry, flags);
}
--
1.7.1
----------------------------------------
--
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