Date:	Thu, 16 Jul 2015 17:59:22 -0700
From:	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To:	Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
Cc:	Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@...onical.com>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
	Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
	LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
	SELinux-NSA <selinux@...ho.nsa.gov>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>,
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/7] Initial support for user namespace owned mounts

On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 5:45 PM, Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com> wrote:
> On 7/16/2015 4:29 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> I really don't see the benefit of making up extra rules that apply to
>> users outside a userns who try to access specifically a filesystem
>> with backing store.  They wouldn't make sense for filesystems without
>> backing store.
>
> Sure it would. For Smack, it would be the label a file would be
> created with, which would be the label of the process creating
> the memory based filesystem. For SELinux the rules are more a
> touch more sophisticated, but I'm sure that Paul or Stephen could
> come up with how to determine it.
>
> The point, looping all the way back to the beginning, where we
> were talking about just ignoring the labels on the filesystem,
> is that if you use the same Smack label on the files in the
> filesystem as the backing store file has, we'll all be happy.
> If that label isn't something user can write to, he won't be
> able to write to the mounted objects, either. If there is no
> backing store then use the label of the process creating the
> filesystem, which will be the user, which will mean everything
> will work hunky dory.
>
> Yes, there's work involved, but I doubt there's a lot. Getting
> the label from the backing store or the creating process is
> simple enough.
>

So what if Smack used the label of the user creating the filesystem
even for filesystems with backing store?  IMO this ought to be doable
with the LSM hooks -- it certainly seems reasonable for the LSM to be
aware of who created a filesystem.  In fact, I'd argue that if Smack
can't do this with the proposed LSM hooks, then the hooks are
insufficient.

Presumably Smack could also figure out what was mounted, but keep in
mind that there are filesystems like ntfs-3g out there.  While ntfs-3g
logically has backing store, I don't think the kernel actually knows
about it.

>
>>>>> If you can mount a filesystem such that the labels are ignored you
>>>>> are effectively specifying that the Smack label on the files be
>>>>> determined by the defaulting rules. With CAP_MAC_ADMIN that's fine.
>>>>> Without it, it's not.
>>>> Can you explain what the threat model is here?  I don't see what it is
>>>> that you're trying to prevent.
>>> Um, OK.
>>> The filesystem has files with a hundred different Smack labels on it.
>>> I mount it as an unlabeled filesystem and everything is readable by
>>> everyone. Bad jojo.
>> I still don't understand.  If it's a filesystem backed by a file that
>> Seth has RW access to, then Seth can read everything on it, full stop.
>> The security labels in the filesystem are irrelevant.
>
> Well, they can't be trusted, if that's what you mean.
> That's why I'm saying that the objects exposed by mounting
> this backing store need to be treated with the same security
> attributes as the backing store. Fudge it for DAC if you are
> so inclined, but I think it's the right way to go for MAC.
>
>> This is like saying that, if you put restrictive labels in the
>> filesystem that lives on /dev/sda2 and give Seth ownership of
>> /dev/sda2, then you expect Seth to be unable to bypass the policy
>> specifies by your labels.
>
> Consider the Smack label on /dev/sda2. Smack does not care
> who owns it, just what the Smack label is. Just like on
> ~/seth/myfs. The backing store "object" is /dev/sda2 in the
> one case, ~/seth/myfs in the other, and something in the ether
> for a memory based filesystem. So long as the labels of the
> files exposed on the mount point match those of the backing
> store "object", Smack is going to be happy. Since you're
> running without privilege, you can't change the labels on
> the files.
>
> Now Seth, being the sneaky person that he is, could change
> the Smack labels on the files in the backing store while it's
> offline. Since he has access to the backing store, he can't
> give himself more access by changing the labels within the
> filesystem. He can give himself less, but I'm OK with that.
>
>> Or maybe I'm misunderstanding you.
>
> Probably, but I'm undoubtedly doing the same.
>
> If you're going to be at LinuxCon in Seattle we should
> continue this discussion over the beverage of your choice.

There's a small but not quite zero chance I'll be there.  I'll
probably be in Seoul.  It's too bad that LSS and KS are in different
places this year.

--Andy
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