linux-kernel - Re: linux-next: manual merge of the audit tree with the selinux tree

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Date:   Mon, 14 May 2018 23:16:12 -0400
From:   Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
To:     Stephen Rothwell <sfr@...b.auug.org.au>
Cc:     Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
        Linux-Next Mailing List <linux-next@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: linux-next: manual merge of the audit tree with the selinux tree

On 2018-05-15 13:06, Stephen Rothwell wrote:
> Hi Paul,
> 
> Today's linux-next merge of the audit tree got a conflict in:
> 
>   security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
> 
> between commit:
> 
>   4195ed425d3c ("audit: normalize MAC_STATUS record")
> 
> from the selinux tree and commits:
> 
>   cdfb6b341f0f ("audit: use inline function to get audit context")
>   d141136f523a ("audit: normalize MAC_POLICY_LOAD record")
> 
> from the audit tree.
> 
> I fixed it up (see below) and can carry the fix as necessary. This
> is now fixed as far as linux-next is concerned, but any non trivial
> conflicts should be mentioned to your upstream maintainer when your tree
> is submitted for merging.  You may also want to consider cooperating
> with the maintainer of the conflicting tree to minimise any particularly
> complex conflicts.

This was expected...  It looks ok.

> -- 
> Cheers,
> Stephen Rothwell
> 
> diff --cc security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
> index c0cadbc5f85c,35fd77737c59..000000000000
> --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
> @@@ -167,13 -167,11 +167,13 @@@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struc
>   				      NULL);
>   		if (length)
>   			goto out;
> - 		audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
> + 		audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
>  -			"enforcing=%d old_enforcing=%d auid=%u ses=%u",
>  +			"enforcing=%d old_enforcing=%d auid=%u ses=%u"
>  +			" enabled=%d old-enabled=%d lsm=selinux res=1",
>   			new_value, old_value,
>   			from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
>  -			audit_get_sessionid(current));
>  +			audit_get_sessionid(current),
>  +			selinux_enabled, selinux_enabled);
>   		enforcing_set(state, new_value);
>   		if (new_value)
>   			avc_ss_reset(state->avc, 0);
> @@@ -303,12 -299,10 +303,12 @@@ static ssize_t sel_write_disable(struc
>   		length = selinux_disable(fsi->state);
>   		if (length)
>   			goto out;
> - 		audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
> + 		audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
>  -			"selinux=0 auid=%u ses=%u",
>  +			"enforcing=%d old_enforcing=%d auid=%u ses=%u"
>  +			" enabled=%d old-enabled=%d lsm=selinux res=1",
>  +			enforcing, enforcing,
>   			from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
>  -			audit_get_sessionid(current));
>  +			audit_get_sessionid(current), 0, 1);
>   	}
>   
>   	length = count;
> @@@ -581,8 -575,8 +581,8 @@@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct fi
>   	length = count;
>   
>   out1:
> - 	audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD,
> + 	audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD,
>  -		"policy loaded auid=%u ses=%u",
>  +		"auid=%u ses=%u lsm=selinux res=1",
>   		from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
>   		audit_get_sessionid(current));
>   out:



- RGB

--
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems
Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635