linux-kernel - linux-next: manual merge of the audit tree with the selinux tree

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Date:   Tue, 15 May 2018 13:06:19 +1000
From:   Stephen Rothwell <sfr@...b.auug.org.au>
To:     Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
Cc:     Linux-Next Mailing List <linux-next@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
Subject: linux-next: manual merge of the audit tree with the selinux tree

Hi Paul,

Today's linux-next merge of the audit tree got a conflict in:

  security/selinux/selinuxfs.c

between commit:

  4195ed425d3c ("audit: normalize MAC_STATUS record")

from the selinux tree and commits:

  cdfb6b341f0f ("audit: use inline function to get audit context")
  d141136f523a ("audit: normalize MAC_POLICY_LOAD record")

from the audit tree.

I fixed it up (see below) and can carry the fix as necessary. This
is now fixed as far as linux-next is concerned, but any non trivial
conflicts should be mentioned to your upstream maintainer when your tree
is submitted for merging.  You may also want to consider cooperating
with the maintainer of the conflicting tree to minimise any particularly
complex conflicts.

-- 
Cheers,
Stephen Rothwell

diff --cc security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index c0cadbc5f85c,35fd77737c59..000000000000
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@@ -167,13 -167,11 +167,13 @@@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struc
  				      NULL);
  		if (length)
  			goto out;
- 		audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
+ 		audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
 -			"enforcing=%d old_enforcing=%d auid=%u ses=%u",
 +			"enforcing=%d old_enforcing=%d auid=%u ses=%u"
 +			" enabled=%d old-enabled=%d lsm=selinux res=1",
  			new_value, old_value,
  			from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
 -			audit_get_sessionid(current));
 +			audit_get_sessionid(current),
 +			selinux_enabled, selinux_enabled);
  		enforcing_set(state, new_value);
  		if (new_value)
  			avc_ss_reset(state->avc, 0);
@@@ -303,12 -299,10 +303,12 @@@ static ssize_t sel_write_disable(struc
  		length = selinux_disable(fsi->state);
  		if (length)
  			goto out;
- 		audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
+ 		audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
 -			"selinux=0 auid=%u ses=%u",
 +			"enforcing=%d old_enforcing=%d auid=%u ses=%u"
 +			" enabled=%d old-enabled=%d lsm=selinux res=1",
 +			enforcing, enforcing,
  			from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
 -			audit_get_sessionid(current));
 +			audit_get_sessionid(current), 0, 1);
  	}
  
  	length = count;
@@@ -581,8 -575,8 +581,8 @@@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct fi
  	length = count;
  
  out1:
- 	audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD,
+ 	audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD,
 -		"policy loaded auid=%u ses=%u",
 +		"auid=%u ses=%u lsm=selinux res=1",
  		from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
  		audit_get_sessionid(current));
  out:

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