linux-kernel - [PATCH] x86/speculation/l1tf: Exempt zeroed PTEs from XOR conversion

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Date:   Thu, 16 Aug 2018 13:46:38 -0700
From:   Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>
To:     Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, x86@...nel.org
Cc:     "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
        Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
        Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
        Michal Hocko <mhocko@...e.com>,
        Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Subject: [PATCH] x86/speculation/l1tf: Exempt zeroed PTEs from XOR conversion

clear_page() does not undergo the XOR logic to invert the address
bits, i.e. PTE, PMD and PUD entries that have not been individually
written will have val=0 and so will trigger __pte_needs_invert().
As a result, {pte,pmd,pud}_pfn() will return the wrong PFN value,
i.e. all ones (adjusted by the max PFN mask) instead of zero.
A zeroed entry is ok because the page at physical address 0 is
reserved early in boot specifically to mitigate L1TF, so explicitly
exempt them from the inversion when reading the PFN.

Manifested as an unexpected mprotect(..., PROT_NONE) failure when
called on a VMA that has VM_PFNMAP and was mmap'd to as something
other than PROT_NONE but never used.  mprotect() sends the PROT_NONE
request down prot_none_walk(), which walks the PTEs to check the PFNs.
prot_none_pte_entry() gets the bogus PFN from pte_pfn() and returns
-EACCES because it thinks mprotect() is trying to adjust a high MMIO
address.

Fixes: 6b28baca9b1f ("x86/speculation/l1tf: Protect PROT_NONE PTEs against speculation")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@...e.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 9 ++++++---
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
index e4ffa565a69f..f21a1df4ca89 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -195,21 +195,24 @@ static inline u64 protnone_mask(u64 val);
 static inline unsigned long pte_pfn(pte_t pte)
 {
 	phys_addr_t pfn = pte_val(pte);
-	pfn ^= protnone_mask(pfn);
+	if (pfn)
+		pfn ^= protnone_mask(pfn);
 	return (pfn & PTE_PFN_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
 }
 
 static inline unsigned long pmd_pfn(pmd_t pmd)
 {
 	phys_addr_t pfn = pmd_val(pmd);
-	pfn ^= protnone_mask(pfn);
+	if (pfn)
+		pfn ^= protnone_mask(pfn);
 	return (pfn & pmd_pfn_mask(pmd)) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
 }
 
 static inline unsigned long pud_pfn(pud_t pud)
 {
 	phys_addr_t pfn = pud_val(pud);
-	pfn ^= protnone_mask(pfn);
+	if (pfn)
+		pfn ^= protnone_mask(pfn);
 	return (pfn & pud_pfn_mask(pud)) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
 }
 
-- 
2.18.0