linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] x86/speculation/l1tf: Exempt zeroed PTEs from XOR conversion

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:   Fri, 17 Aug 2018 07:39:34 -0700
From:   Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>
To:     Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>
Cc:     Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, x86@...nel.org,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
        Michal Hocko <mhocko@...e.com>,
        Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        torvalds@...ux-foundation.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/speculation/l1tf: Exempt zeroed PTEs from XOR
 conversion

On Thu, Aug 16, 2018 at 01:46:38PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> clear_page() does not undergo the XOR logic to invert the address
> bits, i.e. PTE, PMD and PUD entries that have not been individually
> written will have val=0 and so will trigger __pte_needs_invert().
> As a result, {pte,pmd,pud}_pfn() will return the wrong PFN value,
> i.e. all ones (adjusted by the max PFN mask) instead of zero.
> A zeroed entry is ok because the page at physical address 0 is
> reserved early in boot specifically to mitigate L1TF, so explicitly
> exempt them from the inversion when reading the PFN.
> 
> Manifested as an unexpected mprotect(..., PROT_NONE) failure when
> called on a VMA that has VM_PFNMAP and was mmap'd to as something
> other than PROT_NONE but never used.  mprotect() sends the PROT_NONE
> request down prot_none_walk(), which walks the PTEs to check the PFNs.
> prot_none_pte_entry() gets the bogus PFN from pte_pfn() and returns
> -EACCES because it thinks mprotect() is trying to adjust a high MMIO
> address.

Looks good to me. You're right that case was missed.

Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>

I think Thomas is still on vacation, copying Linus.

-Andi