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Date: Tue, 05 Jun 2012 20:39:48 +0200
From: Damian Lukowski <damian@....rwth-aachen.de>
To: Jerry Chu <hkchu@...gle.com>
Cc: Netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>,
Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@...sinki.fi>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/3] Revert Backoff [v3]: Calculate TCP's connection close
threshold as a time value.
Am Dienstag, den 05.06.2012, 10:42 -0700 schrieb Jerry Chu:
> On Mon, Jun 4, 2012 at 4:50 PM, Jerry Chu <hkchu@...gle.com> wrote:
> > Hi Damian,
> >
> > On Mon, Jun 4, 2012 at 10:50 AM, Damian Lukowski
> > <damian@....rwth-aachen.de> wrote:
> >> Hi Jerry,
> >>
> >> please verify, I understood you correctly.
> >>
> >> You have set TCP_RTO_MIN to a lower value, e.g. 0.002 seconds to improve
> >> your internal low-latency traffic. Because of the improvement, R1
> >> timeouts are triggered too fast for external high-RTT traffic. Is that
> >> correct?
> >
> > Correct.
> >
> >> If so, may I suggest to set tcp_retries1 to a higher value? For
> >> TCP_RTO_MIN == 0.002 and tcp_retries1 == 10, R1 will be calculated to
> >> approximately 4 seconds.
> >
> > I think hacking tcp_retries1 is the wrong solution. E.g., 10 retries may be too
> > generous for those short RTT flows.
> >
> > I think the fundamental problem is - the ideal fix for your original RTO revert
> > problem should've used the per-flow RTO to compute R1 & R2. But that
> > computation may be too expensive so you used TCP_RTO_MIN as an
> > approximation - not a good idea IMHO!
>
> Just realized the correct fix of using the original, non-backoff per flow RTO is
> not any more expensive than the current code through ilog2(). What's needed
> is a new field "base_rto" to record the original RTO before backoff. I'm leaning
> toward this more accurate fix now without any fudge because fudging almost
> always causes bugs.
The current version of retransmits_timed_out() uses such a field
already. I suppose, we can do a combination like the following?
- unsigned int rto_base = syn_set ? TCP_TIMEOUT_INIT : TCP_RTO_MIN;
+ unsigned int rto_base = syn_set ? TCP_TIMEOUT_INIT : __tcp_set_rto(tcp_sk(sk));
+ rto_base = rto_base ? : TCP_RTO_MIN;
- if (!inet_csk(sk)->icsk_retransmits)
+ if (inet_csk(sk)->icsk_retransmits < boundary)
Regards
Damian
>
> Any comment is welcome. I'm not sure in the existing code if it makes sense
> to apply the exponential backoff based computation to thin stream but it's a
> separate question so I won't touch it.
>
> Jerry
>
> >
> > The easiest solution I can see so far is to replace the check
> >
> > if (!inet_csk(sk)->icsk_retransmits)
> > return false;
> >
> > at the beginning of retransmits_timed_out() with
> >
> > if (inet_csk(sk)->icsk_retransmits < boundary)
> > return false;
> >
> > Best,
> >
> > Jerry
> >
> >>
> >> Is that ok?
> >>
> >> Best regards
> >> Damian
> >>
> >> Am Freitag, den 01.06.2012, 15:58 -0700 schrieb Jerry Chu:
> >>> > From: Damian Lukowski <damian@....rwth-aachen.de>
> >>> > Date: Wed, Aug 26, 2009 at 3:16 AM
> >>> > Subject: [PATCH 3/3] Revert Backoff [v3]: Calculate TCP's connection close
> >>> > threshold as a time value.
> >>> > To: Netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>
> >>> >
> >>> >
> >>> > RFC 1122 specifies two threshold values R1 and R2 for connection timeouts,
> >>> > which may represent a number of allowed retransmissions or a timeout value.
> >>> > Currently linux uses sysctl_tcp_retries{1,2} to specify the thresholds
> >>> > in number of allowed retransmissions.
> >>> >
> >>> > For any desired threshold R2 (by means of time) one can specify tcp_retries2
> >>> > (by means of number of retransmissions) such that TCP will not time out
> >>> > earlier than R2. This is the case, because the RTO schedule follows a fixed
> >>> > pattern, namely exponential backoff.
> >>> >
> >>> > However, the RTO behaviour is not predictable any more if RTO backoffs can
> >>> > be
> >>> > reverted, as it is the case in the draft
> >>> > "Make TCP more Robust to Long Connectivity Disruptions"
> >>> > (http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-zimmermann-tcp-lcd).
> >>> >
> >>> > In the worst case TCP would time out a connection after 3.2 seconds, if the
> >>> > initial RTO equaled MIN_RTO and each backoff has been reverted.
> >>> >
> >>> > This patch introduces a function retransmits_timed_out(N),
> >>> > which calculates the timeout of a TCP connection, assuming an initial
> >>> > RTO of MIN_RTO and N unsuccessful, exponentially backed-off retransmissions.
> >>> >
> >>> > Whenever timeout decisions are made by comparing the retransmission counter
> >>> > to some value N, this function can be used, instead.
> >>> >
> >>> > The meaning of tcp_retries2 will be changed, as many more RTO
> >>> > retransmissions
> >>> > can occur than the value indicates. However, it yields a timeout which is
> >>> > similar to the one of an unpatched, exponentially backing off TCP in the
> >>> > same
> >>> > scenario. As no application could rely on an RTO greater than MIN_RTO, there
> >>> > should be no risk of a regression.
> >>>
> >>> This looks like a typical "fix one problem, introducing a few more" patch :(.
> >>> What do you mean by "no application could rely on an RTO greater than
> >>> MIN_RTO..."
> >>> above? How can you make the assumption that RTO is not too far off
> >>> from TCP_RTO_MIN?
> >>>
> >>> While you tried to address a problem where the retransmission count
> >>> was high but the actual
> >>> timeout duration was too short, have you considered the other case
> >>> around, i.e., the timeout
> >>> duration is long but the retransmission count is too short? This is
> >>> exactly what's happening
> >>> to us with your patch. We've much reduced TCP_RTO_MIN for our internal
> >>> traffic, but not
> >>> noticing your change has severely shortened the R1 & R2 recommended by
> >>> RFC1122 for our
> >>> long haul traffic until now. In many cases R1 threshold was met upon
> >>> the first retrans timeout.
> >>>
> >>> I think retransmits_timed_out() should check against both time
> >>> duration and retrans count
> >>> (icsk_retransmits).
> >>>
> >>> Thought?
> >>>
> >>> Jerry
> >>>
> >>> >
> >>> > Signed-off-by: Damian Lukowski <damian@....rwth-aachen.de>
> >>> > ---
> >>> > include/net/tcp.h | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
> >>> > net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c | 11 +++++++----
> >>> > 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> >>> >
> >>> > diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h
> >>> > index c35b329..17d1a88 100644
> >>> > --- a/include/net/tcp.h
> >>> > +++ b/include/net/tcp.h
> >>> > @@ -1247,6 +1247,24 @@ static inline struct sk_buff
> >>> > *tcp_write_queue_prev(struct sock *sk, struct sk_bu
> >>> > #define tcp_for_write_queue_from_safe(skb, tmp, sk) \
> >>> > skb_queue_walk_from_safe(&(sk)->sk_write_queue, skb, tmp)
> >>> >
> >>> > +static inline bool retransmits_timed_out(const struct sock *sk,
> >>> > + unsigned int boundary)
> >>> > +{
> >>> > + int limit, K;
> >>> > + if (!inet_csk(sk)->icsk_retransmits)
> >>> > + return false;
> >>> > +
> >>> > + K = ilog2(TCP_RTO_MAX/TCP_RTO_MIN);
> >>> > +
> >>> > + if (boundary <= K)
> >>> > + limit = ((2 << boundary) - 1) * TCP_RTO_MIN;
> >>> > + else
> >>> > + limit = ((2 << K) - 1) * TCP_RTO_MIN +
> >>> > + (boundary - K) * TCP_RTO_MAX;
> >>> > +
> >>> > + return (tcp_time_stamp - tcp_sk(sk)->retrans_stamp) >= limit;
> >>> > +}
> >>> > +
> >>> > static inline struct sk_buff *tcp_send_head(struct sock *sk)
> >>> > {
> >>> > return sk->sk_send_head;
> >>> > diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c
> >>> > index a3ba494..2972d7b 100644
> >>> > --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c
> >>> > +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c
> >>> > @@ -137,13 +137,14 @@ static int tcp_write_timeout(struct sock *sk)
> >>> > {
> >>> > struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
> >>> > int retry_until;
> >>> > + bool do_reset;
> >>> >
> >>> > if ((1 << sk->sk_state) & (TCPF_SYN_SENT | TCPF_SYN_RECV)) {
> >>> > if (icsk->icsk_retransmits)
> >>> > dst_negative_advice(&sk->sk_dst_cache);
> >>> > retry_until = icsk->icsk_syn_retries ? :
> >>> > sysctl_tcp_syn_retries;
> >>> > } else {
> >>> > - if (icsk->icsk_retransmits >= sysctl_tcp_retries1) {
> >>> > + if (retransmits_timed_out(sk, sysctl_tcp_retries1)) {
> >>> > /* Black hole detection */
> >>> > tcp_mtu_probing(icsk, sk);
> >>> >
> >>> > @@ -155,13 +156,15 @@ static int tcp_write_timeout(struct sock *sk)
> >>> > const int alive = (icsk->icsk_rto < TCP_RTO_MAX);
> >>> >
> >>> > retry_until = tcp_orphan_retries(sk, alive);
> >>> > + do_reset = alive ||
> >>> > + !retransmits_timed_out(sk, retry_until);
> >>> >
> >>> > - if (tcp_out_of_resources(sk, alive ||
> >>> > icsk->icsk_retransmits < retry_until))
> >>> > + if (tcp_out_of_resources(sk, do_reset))
> >>> > return 1;
> >>> > }
> >>> > }
> >>> >
> >>> > - if (icsk->icsk_retransmits >= retry_until) {
> >>> > + if (retransmits_timed_out(sk, retry_until)) {
> >>> > /* Has it gone just too far? */
> >>> > tcp_write_err(sk);
> >>> > return 1;
> >>> > @@ -385,7 +388,7 @@ void tcp_retransmit_timer(struct sock *sk)
> >>> > out_reset_timer:
> >>> > icsk->icsk_rto = min(icsk->icsk_rto << 1, TCP_RTO_MAX);
> >>> > inet_csk_reset_xmit_timer(sk, ICSK_TIME_RETRANS, icsk->icsk_rto,
> >>> > TCP_RTO_MAX);
> >>> > - if (icsk->icsk_retransmits > sysctl_tcp_retries1)
> >>> > + if (retransmits_timed_out(sk, sysctl_tcp_retries1 + 1))
> >>> > __sk_dst_reset(sk);
> >>> >
> >>> > out:;
> >>> > --
> >>> > 1.6.3.3
> >>> >
> >>> > --
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> >>> >
> >>
> >>
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