Date:	Fri, 19 Sep 2014 11:24:38 +0200
From:	Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@...unet.com>
To:	Tobias Brunner <tobias@...ongswan.org>
CC:	<davem@...emloft.net>, <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
	Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC ipsec-next] xfrm: Add sysctl option to enforce
 inbound policies for transport mode

Ccing Herbert Xu.

On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 12:49:39PM +0200, Tobias Brunner wrote:
> Currently inbound policies for transport mode SAs are not enforced.
> If no policy is found or if the templates don't match this is not
> considered an error for transport mode SAs.
> 

The strict inbound policy enforcement was implemented by Herbert.
The commit predates our git history but can be found in the history
tree:

git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git

It was the following commit:

commit 8fe7ee2ba983fd89b2555dce5930ffd0f7f6c361
Author: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
Date:   Thu Oct 23 14:57:11 2003 -0700

    [IPSEC]: Strengthen policy checks.

Maybe Herbert remembers why this was done only for tunnel mode.

If I read section 5.2.1 of RFC 2401 correct, the inbound policy
must be enforced regardless of the mode.

> The new sysctl option (net.core.xfrm_enforce_policies_transport_mode)
> allows enforcing the inbound policies also for transport mode SAs.
> By default this option remains disabled.

I'd not like to have a sysctl for this. I consider it as a bug
if an installed policy can not be enforced, and we don't fix bugs
with sysctls :).

> 
> Signed-off-by: Tobias Brunner <tobias@...ongswan.org>
> ---
> Consider a transport mode SA between two peers over which only TCP and
> ICMP traffic should be allowed.  Because two protocols are involved the
> selector on the SA itself (xfrm_usersa_info.sel) can't be set.  Instead
> one either has to negotiate separate SAs for each protocol (with a
> selector on each) or negotiate one SA and install two policies that
> use it.  The problem with the latter is that the peer does not have to
> adhere to the negotiated traffic selectors, it is basically free to
> send anything over the SA e.g. UDP packets.  So if no selectors are
> installed on the SA itself, the current implementation would accept
> such packets, even though the installed policies don't allow UDP
> traffic (some might consider this a security issue - at the very least
> it is not very intuitive, especially because the behavior is different
> for tunnel mode SAs).
> By enabling the new sysctl option the UDP packets would get dropped,
> exactly as they would if the SA were negotiated in tunnel mode.
> 
> The behavior for optional transport mode templates also changes when
> the option is enabled.  Basically, the special treatment of transport
> mode SAs is disabled and the behavior is like it is for other modes.
> I tested this with IPComp/ESP and strongSwan where the optional IPComp
> transform is installed in transport or tunnel mode depending on the
> negotiated mode of the SA (the ESP SA is always installed in transport
> mode in this combination).  But I'm not sure if there are other uses
> for optional transport mode transforms that might rely on the current
> behavior (i.e. why are optional templates treated differently depending
> on their mode in the first place?).

The code arround xfrm_policy_ok() looks a bit obscure, I'm not sure if
all combinations of required and optional templates are handled correct.

> 
> With this patch the default behavior remains as it is, but I wondered
> why it is like that and if we could perhaps change it so that policies
> are enforced by default, thus making such setups more secure out of
> the box.  Or if we could even change the whole inbound processing so
> that transport mode SAs are treated exactly like their counterparts
> in other modes, without an option to change it.
> 
>  Documentation/networking/xfrm_sysctl.txt |  4 ++++
>  include/net/netns/xfrm.h                 |  1 +
>  net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c                   | 24 +++++++++++++++---------
>  net/xfrm/xfrm_sysctl.c                   |  8 ++++++++
>  4 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/networking/xfrm_sysctl.txt b/Documentation/networking/xfrm_sysctl.txt
> index 5bbd167..2fbe539 100644
> --- a/Documentation/networking/xfrm_sysctl.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/networking/xfrm_sysctl.txt
> @@ -2,3 +2,7 @@
>   xfrm_acq_expires - INTEGER
>  	default 30 - hard timeout in seconds for acquire requests
> +
> +xfrm_enforce_policies_transport_mode - BOOLEAN
> +	default 0 (disabled) - whether to enforce inbound policies for transport
> +	mode SAs
> \ No newline at end of file
> diff --git a/include/net/netns/xfrm.h b/include/net/netns/xfrm.h
> index 9da7982..e045ecc 100644
> --- a/include/net/netns/xfrm.h
> +++ b/include/net/netns/xfrm.h
> @@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ struct netns_xfrm {
>  	u32			sysctl_aevent_rseqth;
>  	int			sysctl_larval_drop;
>  	u32			sysctl_acq_expires;
> +	int			sysctl_enforce_policies_transport_mode;
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
>  	struct ctl_table_header	*sysctl_hdr;
>  #endif
> diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
> index 55bcb86..5296f6b 100644
> --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
> +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
> @@ -2355,20 +2355,22 @@ xfrm_state_ok(const struct xfrm_tmpl *tmpl, const struct xfrm_state *x,
>   * Otherwise "-2 - errored_index" is returned.
>   */
>  static inline int
> -xfrm_policy_ok(const struct xfrm_tmpl *tmpl, const struct sec_path *sp, int start,
> -	       unsigned short family)
> +xfrm_policy_ok(const struct net *net, const struct xfrm_tmpl *tmpl,
> +	       const struct sec_path *sp, int start, unsigned short family)
>  {
>  	int idx = start;
>   	if (tmpl->optional) {
> -		if (tmpl->mode == XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT)
> +		if (tmpl->mode == XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT &&
> +		    !net->xfrm.sysctl_enforce_policies_transport_mode)
>  			return start;
>  	} else
>  		start = -1;
>  	for (; idx < sp->len; idx++) {
>  		if (xfrm_state_ok(tmpl, sp->xvec[idx], family))
>  			return ++idx;
> -		if (sp->xvec[idx]->props.mode != XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT) {
> +		if (sp->xvec[idx]->props.mode != XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT ||
> +		    net->xfrm.sysctl_enforce_policies_transport_mode) {
>  			if (start == -1)
>  				start = -2-idx;
>  			break;
> @@ -2393,10 +2395,13 @@ int __xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl,
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(__xfrm_decode_session);
>  -static inline int secpath_has_nontransport(const struct sec_path *sp, int k, int *idxp)
> +static inline int secpath_has_nontransport(const struct net *net,
> +					   const struct sec_path *sp,
> +					   int k, int *idxp)
>  {
>  	for (; k < sp->len; k++) {
> -		if (sp->xvec[k]->props.mode != XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT) {
> +		if (sp->xvec[k]->props.mode != XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT ||
> +		    net->xfrm.sysctl_enforce_policies_transport_mode) {
>  			*idxp = k;
>  			return 1;
>  		}
> @@ -2469,7 +2474,8 @@ int __xfrm_policy_check(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct sk_buff *skb,
>  	}
>   	if (!pol) {
> -		if (skb->sp && secpath_has_nontransport(skb->sp, 0, &xerr_idx)) {
> +		if (skb->sp &&
> +		    secpath_has_nontransport(net, skb->sp, 0, &xerr_idx)) {
>  			xfrm_secpath_reject(xerr_idx, skb, &fl);
>  			XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMINNOPOLS);
>  			return 0;
> @@ -2535,7 +2541,7 @@ int __xfrm_policy_check(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct sk_buff *skb,
>  		 * are implied between each two transformations.
>  		 */
>  		for (i = xfrm_nr-1, k = 0; i >= 0; i--) {
> -			k = xfrm_policy_ok(tpp[i], sp, k, family);
> +			k = xfrm_policy_ok(net, tpp[i], sp, k, family);
>  			if (k < 0) {
>  				if (k < -1)
>  					/* "-2 - errored_index" returned */
> @@ -2545,7 +2551,7 @@ int __xfrm_policy_check(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct sk_buff *skb,
>  			}
>  		}
>  -		if (secpath_has_nontransport(sp, k, &xerr_idx)) {
> +		if (secpath_has_nontransport(net, sp, k, &xerr_idx)) {
>  			XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMINTMPLMISMATCH);
>  			goto reject;
>  		}
> diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_sysctl.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_sysctl.c
> index 05a6e3d..17671af 100644
> --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_sysctl.c
> +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_sysctl.c
> @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ static void __net_init __xfrm_sysctl_init(struct net *net)
>  	net->xfrm.sysctl_aevent_rseqth = XFRM_AE_SEQT_SIZE;
>  	net->xfrm.sysctl_larval_drop = 1;
>  	net->xfrm.sysctl_acq_expires = 30;
> +	net->xfrm.sysctl_enforce_policies_transport_mode = 0;
>  }
>   #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
> @@ -37,6 +38,12 @@ static struct ctl_table xfrm_table[] = {
>  		.mode		= 0644,
>  		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec
>  	},
> +	{
> +		.procname	= "xfrm_enforce_policies_transport_mode",
> +		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
> +		.mode		= 0644,
> +		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec
> +	},
>  	{}
>  };
>  @@ -53,6 +60,7 @@ int __net_init xfrm_sysctl_init(struct net *net)
>  	table[1].data = &net->xfrm.sysctl_aevent_rseqth;
>  	table[2].data = &net->xfrm.sysctl_larval_drop;
>  	table[3].data = &net->xfrm.sysctl_acq_expires;
> +	table[4].data = &net->xfrm.sysctl_enforce_policies_transport_mode;
>   	/* Don't export sysctls to unprivileged users */
>  	if (net->user_ns != &init_user_ns)
> -- 
> 1.9.1
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe netdev" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

Powered by blists - more mailing lists