netdev - Re: [PATCH 7/7] mac80211: Switch to new AEAD interface

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Date:	Mon, 01 Jun 2015 15:49:58 +0200
From:	Stephan Mueller <smueller@...onox.de>
To:	Johannes Berg <johannes@...solutions.net>
Cc:	Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
	Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
	netdev@...r.kernel.org, "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
	Marcel Holtmann <marcel@...tmann.org>,
	Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@...unet.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 7/7] mac80211: Switch to new AEAD interface

Am Montag, 1. Juni 2015, 15:42:41 schrieb Johannes Berg:

Hi Johannes,

>On Mon, 2015-06-01 at 15:21 +0200, Stephan Mueller wrote:
>> Just a short question on ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt,
>> ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt, ieee80211_aes_gcm_encrypt,
>> ieee80211_aes_gcm_decrypt, ieee80211_aes_gmac: can the aad parameter of
>> these functions be zero?
>
>What do you mean by "zero"? The pointer itself can clearly never be
>NULL.

Thanks for clarifying: indeed I mean the value of the pointer, not the pointer 
itself :-)
>
>The contents, now, that's a more interesting question. I believe it can
>never be all zeroes, since association request frames are not
>encrypted/protected and thus at least one byte in here must be non-zero.
>The MAC addresses are also very likely non-zero, but technically
>00:00:00:00:00:00 is a valid MAC address I believe.

So, even when having a malicious AP, that value is never zero? The driver of 
the question is the following code in the patch set:

+       sg_set_buf(&sg[0], &aad[2], be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)aad));

...

+       aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, sg, sg, data_len, b_0);

...

        crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req);


When I played around with the aead_request_set_crypt, I saw a crash in the 
scatterlist handling of the crypto API when the first SGL entry has a zero 
length.

Ciao
Stephan
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