bugtraq - Re: [SECURITY] Remote roster manipulation bug in various Jabber clients

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Message-ID: <20030702205317.GO10801@cerberus>
Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2003 14:53:18 -0600
From: "Jamin W. Collins" <jcollins@...ardsrealm.net>
To: jdev@...ber.org
Cc: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com, jadmin@...ber.org
Subject: Re: [SECURITY] Remote roster manipulation bug in various Jabber clients

On Wed, Jul 02, 2003 at 10:05:11PM +0200, Jacek Konieczny wrote:

> 3. Impact
> 
> The attack cannot be done from Jabber client connection to jabberd
> 1.4.x server because of similar bug (or feature) in this server - it
> doesn't check "to" attribute and all such <iq/>s treats as directed to
> the server. Attacker roster stored on server is modified instead of
> victims ones.

Wouldn't this still be a concern?  The roster on the server would be
modified and only corrected if the client exited properly, thus
resyncing it's list to the server, right?

-- 
Jamin W. Collins

Remember, root always has a loaded gun.  Don't run around with it unless
you absolutely need it. -- Vineet Kumar