bugtraq - Re: [SECURITY] Remote roster manipulation bug in various Jabber clients

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Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2003 17:19:19 -0400
From: Julian Missig <julian@...ber.org>
To: jdev@...ber.org
Cc: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com, jadmin@...ber.org
Subject: Re: [SECURITY] Remote roster manipulation bug in various Jabber clients


On Wednesday, Jul 2, 2003, at 16:53 US/Eastern, Jamin W. Collins wrote:

> On Wed, Jul 02, 2003 at 10:05:11PM +0200, Jacek Konieczny wrote:
>
>> 3. Impact
>>
>> The attack cannot be done from Jabber client connection to jabberd
>> 1.4.x server because of similar bug (or feature) in this server - it
>> doesn't check "to" attribute and all such <iq/>s treats as directed to
>> the server. Attacker roster stored on server is modified instead of
>> victims ones.
>
> Wouldn't this still be a concern?  The roster on the server would be
> modified and only corrected if the client exited properly, thus
> resyncing it's list to the server, right?

Why would it be a concern? It's the *attacker's* roster which would be 
modified in that case, not the victim's. As an aside, clients typically 
do not "resync" their lists to the server when they exit.

Julian