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Message-ID: <20031218003601.7D38.0@argo.troja.mff.cuni.cz>
Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2003 00:43:28 +0100 (MET)
From: Pavel Kankovsky <peak@...o.troja.mff.cuni.cz>
To: Julian Ashton <ashton@...tmedia.com>
Cc: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: Re: Edonkey/Overnet Plugins capable of Virus/Worm behavior


On 17 Dec 2003, Julian Ashton wrote:

> Good question, I have been working on plugin systems suchs as giFT and
> Windows Media for quite a while and while they can do some neat
> things, this kind of behavoir cannot happen because of the way they
> were architechted. When I think of "plugins" I think of 1. An sdk. 2.
> Methods that you create that the "client" listens for. 3. All code in
> the plugin is sent to the "client" not the OS level. 4. Mainly COM
> (this plugin uses full use of C++/MFC in a DLL)

Excuse me...how do giFT or Windows Media prevent their plugins from
accessing the OS interface directly and doing whatever they (the plugins)
want to do? Do they run the plugins in a virtual machine?

--Pavel Kankovsky aka Peak  [ Boycott Microsoft--http://www.vcnet.com/bms ]
"Resistance is futile. Open your source code and prepare for assimilation."





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