bugtraq - Re: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor Account Allows Authenticated Users to Modify Votes

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Message-ID: <3A6E40C2-11F2-11D9-9EE6-000A95DC3176@tuatha.org>
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 2004 09:33:24 +0100
From: Colm Buckley <colm@...tha.org>
To: Simon <lists@...e.org.uk>
Cc: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: Re: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor Account Allows Authenticated Users to Modify Votes

On 28 Sep 2004, at 21:20, Simon wrote:

> How do you know that the software generating the audit trail is 
> playing fair if it's closed source?

This is where the "voter-verified" part of "voter-verified audit trail" 
comes from.  The software produces a visible hardcopy of the voter's 
choice, which the voter has a chance to inspect before it is deposited 
in a ballot box.  Assuming reasonable precautions are taken to prevent 
physical tampering with these boxes, the software record of the votes 
cast can be compared at any time with the paper record - and the paper 
record would have primacy in the event of any discrepancy.

	Colm

-- 
Colm Buckley / colm@...tha.org / www.colm.buckley.name / +353 87 2469146