bugtraq - Re: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor Account Allows Authenticated Users to Modify Votes

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <4159C779.1080101@sime.org.uk>
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 2004 21:20:09 +0100
From: Simon <lists@...e.org.uk>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: Re: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor Account
 Allows Authenticated Users to Modify Votes

Marco S Hyman wrote:
 >
 > All I demand from a voting system is that votes can be voter verified.
 > That's not true of ANY voting machine regardless of who writes the code
 > unless there is a hard copy audit trail.   If there is a hard copy audit
 > trail then it doesn't make any difference who wrote the code.

How do you know that the software generating the audit trail is playing 
fair if it's closed source?

Sometimes, IMHO, there's just no alternative to pen and paper.  Surely 
the manual method of ticking a box and having multiple human vote 
counters checking ballots is the best option going, even if it is more 
expensive.  (I confess I've no idea what costs are involved either way.)