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Message-ID: <20050311203150.17236.qmail@www.securityfocus.com> Date: 11 Mar 2005 20:31:50 -0000 From: <secure@...antec.com> To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com Subject: Re: Multiple AV Vendor Incorrect CRC32 Bypass Vulnerability. In-Reply-To: <20050310112622.4458.qmail@....securityfocus.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 >Date: 10 Mar 2005 11:26:22 -0000 >From: Bipin Gautam <visitbipin@...mail.com> >To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com >Subject: Multiple AV Vendor Incorrect CRC32 Bypass Vulnerability. > > > >Multiple AV Vendor Incorrect CRC32 Bypass Vulnerability. > >Affected Product: > >AntiVir 6.30.0.5 >AVG 718 >Sybari (Antigen for M$ exchange) 7.5.1314 >Symantec 8.0 >McAfee 4442 >BitDefender 7.0 > > >POC: http://www.geocities.com/visitbipin/happy-crc.zip > >Description: >if you create a zip archive with invalid CRC checksum...... some AV >skip the archive marking it as clean........ by this way, you can >bypass antivirus gateways and slip in any attachment without >scanning the archive. Moreover, these days.... software tools >automatically repair a *broken* archive. - -----------snip------------ Symantec is aware of an issue posted to various security mailing lists, in which the poster reported being able to bypass the initial scan of multiple vendor antivirus products including Symantec AntiVirus Corporate Edition version 8.0. The researcher included a link to the proof-of-concept code that he used to validate his tests. According to the posting, by creating a malicious zip archive with an invalid CRC32 checksum, some antivirus vendor's products will not detect the malicious file, providing a method to bypass the antivirus scan at the gateway and potentially compromise targeted systems. Symantec Response Symantec engineers reviewed and tested the poster's proof-of-concept code. In all instances, Symantec was able to successfully decompress the target file and scan the content. However, the eicar test file that the poster used in his proof-of-concept was an invalid test file. While Symantec products did successfully unzip the archive and scan the enclosed file, we were not getting a valid detection on the original enclosed eicar test file. Once we recognized the problem with the poster's version of the eicar test file, we recreated the poster's proof-of-concept test with a valid eicar test file and verified our products successfully detected the valid file. Symantec engineers have determined that this issue does not impact Symantec's antivirus scanning products. Symantec Product Security Contact: Symantec takes the security and proper functionality of its products very seriously. As founding members of the Organization for Internet Safety (OISafety), Symantec follows the principles of responsible disclosure. Symantec also subscribes to the vulnerability guidelines outlined by the National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC). Please contact secure@...antec.com if you feel you have discovered a potential or actual security issue with a Symantec product. A Symantec Product Security team member will contact you regarding your submission. Symantec has developed a Product Vulnerability Handling Process document outlining the process we follow in addressing suspected vulnerabilities in our products. We support responsible disclosure of all vulnerability information in a timely manner to protect Symantec customers and the security of the Internet as a result of vulnerability. This document is available from the location provided below. Symantec strongly recommends using encrypted email for reporting vulnerability information to secure@...antec.com. The Symantec Product Security PGP key can be obtained from http://www.symantec.com/security -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP 8.0.2 iQA/AwUBQjIAcwLsezw0Sg5hEQIw6ACgu1OEITv8QFfgLBFpZCRZYAEAaJgAoJ10 MqkTSBAlLAHRns46h7Rm6yTB =TR5a -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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