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Date: Sat, 3 Dec 2005 20:49:47 -0600 (CST)
From: "Michael J. Pomraning" <mjp@...urepipe.com>
To: "Steven M. Christey" <coley@...re.org>
Cc: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk, bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: Re: Format String Vulnerabilities in Perl Programs


On Fri, 2 Dec 2005, Steven M. Christey wrote:

> In particular, the sprintf() and printf() functions in Perl can be
> abused if an attacker can control the contents of the format string.
> Since similar functions are used in C, it is possible that these
> functions will be used more frequently by C programmers who are new to
> Perl.
<<SNIP>> 
>  - for each programming language, identify and publicize all builtin
>    or common library functions that use format strings.

For Perl projects, I'd also nominate syslog(), from the standard Sys::Syslog
module, for special attention.  It's common in *NIX environments regardless
of programmers' backgrounds and is extremely likely to be called with
untrusted data interpolated directly in the format string argument --
syslog("info", "A user said $user_input"), for example.

Regards,
Mike
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