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Message-ID: <20071101191406.14284.qmail@securityfocus.com> Date: 1 Nov 2007 19:14:06 -0000 From: ntn@...workontap.com To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com Subject: Re: Re: Comments re ISC's announcement on bind9 security Given the extremely small amount of space for randomization (16-bit query ID's) does a cryptographically strong PRNG really make difference? Aside from stopping an easy prediction, doesn't it just generate a little extra work for a determined malicious individual? Seems to be a moot point to me---whether the PRNG is cryptographically weak or not because of the small sequence number space. -ntn