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Message-Id: <E1N2S0i-0005MZ-00@chiark.greenend.org.uk>
Date: Mon, 26 Oct 2009 16:01:32 +0000
From: Tony Finch <dot@...at.at>
To: pavel@....cz, bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Cc: Tony Finch <dot@...at.at>
Subject: Re: /proc filesystem allows bypassing directory permissions on Linux
Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz> wrote:
>
>pavel@toy:/tmp$ uname -a
>Linux toy.ucw.cz 2.6.32-rc3 #21 Mon Oct 19 07:32:02 CEST 2009 armv5tel GNU/Linux
>pavel@toy:/tmp mkdir my_priv; cd my_priv
Attacker opens my_priv and waits.
>pavel@toy:/tmp/my_priv$ echo this file should never be writable > unwritable_file
># lock down directory
>pavel@toy:/tmp/my_priv$ chmod 700 .
># relax file permissions, directory is private, so this is safe
># check link count on unwritable_file. We would not want someone
># to have a hard link to work around our permissions, would we?
>pavel@toy:/tmp/my_priv$ chmod 666 unwritable_file
>pavel@toy:/tmp/my_priv$ cat unwritable_file
>this file should never be writable
Attacker uses openat() to open and modify the "private" file.
>pavel@toy:/tmp/my_priv$ cat unwritable_file
>got you
># Security problem here
>
>Unexpected? Well, yes, to me anyway. Linux specific? Yes, I think so.
Not quite, as described above: there's a permissions race which
allowed the attacker to open the my_priv directory. Once you
have an fd on a directory it's possible to open any file inside
without a full-path permissions check. If you created the directory
using `mkdir -m 0700` (eliminating the race) then you should be safe.
Tony.
--
f.anthony.n.finch <dot@...at.at> http://dotat.at/
DOVER WIGHT: WEST OR NORTHWEST 5 TO 7 DECREASING 4, THEN BACKING SOUTHEAST
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