Message-ID: <3D6E02F3.1000604@d2.net.au>
From: andrewg at d2.net.au (Andrew Griffiths)
Subject: RPM verification

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Hash: SHA1

Product: rpm
Version tested: 4.0.4

Description
- -----------

	rpm  is  a  powerful Package Manager, which can be used to
~       build, install, query, verify, update, and erase  individ-
~       ual  software  packages.  A package consists of an archive
~       of files and meta-data  used  to  install  and  erase  the
~       archive files. The meta-data includes helper scripts, file
~       attributes, and descriptive information about the package.
~       Packages  come  in two varieties: binary packages, used to
~       encapsulate software to be installed, and source packages,
~       containing the source code and recipe necessary to produce
~       binary packages.


Problem
- -------

	The user can be tricked by thinking that the package came from a trusted
source if the user either has gpg setup to automatically fetch keys from a
keyserver (and the attacker knows, or spams to a majority) or the attacker
initiates a conversation with the victim and the victim puts the attackers
public key in the same gpg database which does the verification of the
signed
rpm package.

Example
- -------

[andrewg@...ckhole rpmzap]$ wget
ftp://ftp.planetmirror.com/pub/redhat/redhat-7.3/en/os/i386/RedHat/RPMS/xloadimage-4.1-21.i386.rpm
- --22:18:59--
ftp://ftp.planetmirror.com/pub/redhat/redhat-7.3/en/os/i386/RedHat/RPMS/xloadimage-4.1-21.i386.rpm
~           => `xloadimage-4.1-21.i386.rpm'
Connecting to 127.0.0.1:3128... connected!
Proxy request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: 141,295 [audio/x-pn-realaudio-plugin]

~    0K -> .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... [ 36%]
~   50K -> .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... [ 72%]
~  100K -> .......... .......... .......... .......               [100%]

22:18:59 (6.74 MB/s) - `xloadimage-4.1-21.i386.rpm' saved [141295/141295]

(
Here, I have done a squid redirection to insert the trojaned file.

We verify the downloaded RPM's as listed on RedHats GPG as of
Thu Aug 22 10:59:09 EST 2002, with rpm --checksig, or its equivalent,
rpm -K.

http://www.redhat.com/solutions/security/news/publickey.html
http://www.redhat.com/solutions/security/news/betapublickey.html

Both listed the way to verify an rpm package, was to do rpm --checksig.

Also, a lot of other distros recommend --checksig to verify. Some
documentation needs to be updated.

)


[andrewg@...ckhole rpmzap]$ rpm -K xloadimage-4.1-21.i386.rpm
xloadimage-4.1-21.i386.rpm: md5 gpg OK

(Everything looks fine... but..)

[andrewg@...ckhole rpmzap]$ rpm -K xloadimage-4.1-21.i386.rpm  -vv
D: Expected size:       141295 = lead(96)+sigs(248)+pad(0)+data(140951)
D:   Actual size:       141295
xloadimage-4.1-21.i386.rpm:
MD5 sum OK: 2bd4c89da85d38f279974d3707e721e3
gpg: Signature made Mon 19 Aug 2002 20:07:22 EST using DSA key ID 5A98A001
gpg: Good signature from Andrew Griffiths (...) <nullptr@...mail.com>"
[andrewg@...ckhole rpmzap]$

(Not signed by RedHat... but the victim most likely doesn't think to
check _who_
signed it.)


Fix(es)
- -------

- - Seperate gpg directory for GPG.
	For your ${HOME}, we'd do something like:
		mkdir .gpg-rpm
		chmod 700 .gpg-rpm
		rpm --import --homedir=${HOME}/.gpg-rpm RPM-GPG-KEY


	now we edit ${HOME}/.rpmmacros, and add/modify
		%_signature gpg
		%_gpg_path _your_home_dir_here/.gpg-rpm

	This way you can have seperate verification thingers, and rpm will
	automatically check the new setup.

As such, the fix is to wait until RPM 4.1, which fixes the problem.

Workarounds
- -----------

- - Maybe parsing gpg's output and printing out signing keyname by default.

- - Whenever you check the packages, use say --checksig -vv to get the 
output
from gpg.

Notes
- -----

- - RedHat Network isn't vulnerable to this issue, as it does the setup
like the
above.

- - Future versions of RPM (4.1) will not be using gpg externally, but
will be maintaining the keys to verify internally.

- - Following notification to Red Hat, they updated their verification
instructions to include the use of the -v flag.

- - Following notification to OpenPKG, they updated their security page, and
their security advisory page.

- - SuSE recommends to verify with rpm -v --checksig file.rpm. They were not
contacted.

- - Caldera didn't appear to offer a gpg signature to verify the rpm's. They
didn't have a public key to encrypt stuff to them.


Greets
- ------

zen-parse - http://mp3.com/cosv
jaguar
remedy
sharrad - http://go.to/innerdreams
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