From: schoe at oicinc.com (Sung J. Choe)
Subject: Cryptome Hacked!

> Let me turn around the issue a bit - any crypto software distributed with
the blessing or very active support in development of the Powers That Are in
No Such Agency
That is my point exactly.  Anybody foolish enough to think that the US govt
would allow unbreakable crypto to be loose in the public domain is insane.
Just imagine an international financial network with transactions conducted
in total secrecy: the govt would and should never allow that.
 
> can we stay clear of political statements on this forum
I apologize for some of the political statements in my post.  However,
please take seriously my questions as they are valid for this forum given
TIA (Total Information Awareness) and the current state of global security.
I appreciate any creative insight anybody may have regarding my question.
Please feel free to disregard the other statements.
 
 
Sung J. Choe < SChoe[at]oicinc.com <mailto:SChoe@...inc.com> >, TICSA
Systems Administrator, Facility Security Officer	

     Oceanic Imaging Consultants, Inc. / www.oicinc.com
<http://www.oicinc.com/>    Ph #: (808) 539-3634

-----Original Message-----
From: yossarian [mailto:yossarian@...net.nl]
Sent: Wednesday, February 26, 2003 2:17 PM
To: full-disclosure@...ts.netsys.com
Subject: Re: [Full-Disclosure] Cryptome Hacked!


Well, the mirror on lessgov is gone too.But http://cryptome.sabotage.org/
<http://cryptome.sabotage.org/>  is still up, anyway. So you can see for
yourself that they have PGP as the only crypto product they offer. If they
have altered it, anyone can see by comparing the source, which they also
provide (both stored offsite, and also unavailable right now)
 
I can believe that you are almost sure, but since this is a fact you can
verify, why assume, why not prove it? 
 
Let me give you a hint: Look at the paper from Claude Crepeau and Alain
Slakmon on Simple Backdoors to RSA key generation. If you want to alter PGP
in a way difficult to detect, this would be the way. Any other way would be
too obvious. If you see how feasable this is, rethink your position. Any
keyscheme you use may be backdoored, so generating your own keypairs might
just not suffice.
 
Let me turn around the issue a bit - any crypto software distributed with
the blessing or very active support in development of the Powers That Are in
No Such Agency, would you assume that there is no backdoor? Just google on
Key Recovery features, in P1363 or any other mainstream PKI - search on
project Krisis by the EU, or look at the archived site kra.org (on
archive.org), look at the discussions related to the wassenaar agreements.
See the continuing story from clipper chip via Key Escrow to CKI on certain
if not all governments wanting access to your keys for policing? What if the
company you serve has offices all over the world? Will you give the
cryptokeys to all the countries were you have offices? Remember that ex-C1A
boss Wooley admitted 'checking' on European companies, whether they violated
trade embargoes? How? As security professionals we need to be aware on who
might be reading our confidential information - and then decide whether this
is acceptable to the company whose data you must secure. Don't forget that
maybe some gov. agencies might lose the keys to the data you should be
protecting. What a nice liability case it would be, heh!. Say I open an
office in Australia - and the gov there wants root to my systems, for
policing. Should I give them access to the corporate network or just the
Australian office? But will my network zoning suffice, to keep them off,
say, my Miami office's network? Is it legal in Florida giving access to
unspecified police or intelligence communities in other countries to data,
maybe even sensitive to national security? This will be a definite No, so in
order not to break the law in one country, I must break it in another
country. How to risk manage this?
 
On a personal note: I am almost sure that the risk to my personal well-being
by the American/Government, albeit small, is bigger than that posed by
extremists as John Young, who do not have much means, budget or interest in
bothering me. Taking on the US govt, as they do, they'll have there hands
full. 
 
And Plz. can we stay clear of political statements on this forum, this is
one of the few places I can hang around and not be bothered by political
statements, not linked at all to the subjectmatter of the list? 
 
Yossarian

----- Original Message ----- 
From: Sung J. Choe <mailto:schoe@...inc.com>  
To: 'full-disclosure@...ts.netsys.com'
<mailto:'full-disclosure@...ts.netsys.com'>  
Sent: Thursday, February 27, 2003 12:10 AM
Subject: [Full-Disclosure] Cryptome Hacked!


Cryptome.org, a site for privacy enthusiasts and leftists alike, was
apparently hacked today.  Their server is up but "all files were deleted".
Besides the usual anti-American/anti-government vitriol that is usually
found at Cryptome.org, they also distribute crypto software.  This brings up
the following question: What is the best method for ensuring the integrity
of software which require a high level of trust?  I am almost sure that any
crypto software distributed by such extremists as John Young (operator of
cryptome.org) has been tampered with in some way.  Does anybody else share
this opinion? 


.--------------------------------------------------. 
| Sung J. Choe <schoe[at]oicinc.com>, TICSA        | 
| Systems Administrator, Facility Security Officer | 
.--------------------------------------------------.----. 
                    | Oceanic Imaging Consultants, Inc. | 
                    | Phone #: (808) 539-3634 x3634     | 
                    .-----------------------------------. 

568D CAD6 53A0 92E6 4A2A  4E87 3BA0 5F90 37BB 8EE7 



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