Message-ID: <74610-220037215225438860@M2W073.mail2web.com>
From: mattmurphy at kc.rr.com (mattmurphy@...rr.com)
Subject: GUNINSKI THE SELF-PROMOTER

>interesting article, and yet, I can't see a reason to fault either
>guninski or danka at this point in the game.  M$ is not known for it;s
>handeling of researchers caught falws in itps codes and apps well, 

No reason to fault either of them, even though Danka completely failed to
use the security contact that is linked at
http://www.microsoft.com/security/, and Guninski has repeatedly failed to
offer vendors anything more than mere days to fix bugs -- if they are
notified at all!

You may remember that Guninski completely failed to notify the VIM
development team of security vulnerabilities in its product, and these were
brought up by a third party on VIM-DEV for the first time.  I would have
understood CC'ing the major security lists with the post *in addition to*
vim-dev, as it *is* a public channel.  

However, there simply is no excuse for the pathetic practice of ignoring
useful communication channels, when provided, in favor of saying that
"vendors need to step up to the plate".  There simply is no defense for
complete lack of notification attempts, particularly as Guninski has *no
history* of reporting bugs to vim's maintainers, and would therefore have
*no idea* of how responsive the vendor was.

Karsten Hopp's message to the vim-dev list regarding Guninski's find is
available at:

http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=vim-dev&m=104039305513986&w=2

and contains the following message, entitled, "vim security bugs":

"Hello,

Georgi Guninski has published the modeline exploit at 
http://www.guninski.com/vim1.html

Is anyone working on that or is there already a patch available to fix this
?
I couldn't find any reference to such a patch in the list archives or in
the README for the official patches."

with the response from Christian J. Robinson a mere four days later, which
contains an interesting quote:

"I think this is the first time it's been mentioned here.  I tried my
hand at fixing it (patch against 6.1.263):"

The message also includes a preliminary patch -- its full content is
available at:

http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=vim-dev&m=104041876306910&w=2

Secondly, he writes in his advisories, things like "Some vim problems, yet
still vim much better than windows" -- comparing an OS to text editor --
even as he admits that major security vulnerabilities exist in the product!
If this isn't self-publicist behavior, nothing is.  Guninski also bashes
Microsoft and other proprietary vendors by saying "Microsoft was notified
on 17 March 2002.  They had 2 weeks to produce a patch but didn't."

The simple fact is, even issues as simple as allowing script execution
(which, in and of itself, cannot compromise a machine), are eventually
fixed.  The truth is that Guninski needs a variety of targets, and feels
that he can do his part to insure the survival of open source by blasting
Microsoft.  

After all, Guninski has not produced an advisory detailing a security
vulnerability of any kind in a Microsoft product since July 31, 2002, so
what right does he have to say that trustworthy computing is a flop? 
Clearly, Georgi Guninski couldn't get a job, and relying on the Apache 1.3
descriptor leak (shudders), or perhaps a local command execution bug in
vim, or worse, a format string in the Etheral socks dissector, wouldn't get
him anywhere.  So, he has slanted every story he could get a hold of,
turning a non-issue of one-month delays into ridiculous, childish, kiddies'
rhetoric about MS' irresponsibility.  Even funnier is that while he was
making a major deal out of MS security being unresponsive, he wasn't even
notifying open-source vendors of security vulnerabilities!

Also, Bruce Schneier has little or no room to talk, as his "Password Safe"
tool was unable to keep local passwords safe, let alone a large product
base of network applications:

http://www.safermag.com/html/safer41/alerts/29.html

>and until vendors can stepup to the plate in the process, meaning that they
>take reported accounts seriously enough to be 'part of the process',
>which they tend to now avoid for various reasons and in various ways, they
>can't expect the need for full disclosure to abate or diminish.  No matter
>how one views the whole disclosure debate, those holding most the cards
>tend to be the vendors.  And vendoor shell games tend to be the most
>debilitating factor in the present standing and long debated disclosure
>issue.  

Once again you rely on the assumption that vendors are irresponsible with
security reports.  While there have been instances of what some would
consider lengthy delays on vendor responses, most of these are easily
explained by the fact that the vulnerability is of negligable impact to the
vast majority of the computing public, such as wildcard "A" records in FTP
sites causing XSS.  Even *I* will admit that the flaw was of a nature that
meant it most likely could not be used to cause any serious damage that an
attacker could not have caused without the vulnerability.  Particularly
given the existing security integrations of IE that prevent sub-domains and
parent domains from interacting (as well as programs on different ports)
without explicitly setting compatible document.domain values (not possible
for services on different protocols/ports).

>And we've not even mentioned the issue of 'responsibility' to
>produce cleaner code, nor who should be held 'liable' for some of the
>crappy applications that vendors push onto the public.

Oh, please.  You obviously have not attempted to develop any kind of
software project, or if you have, if didn't get out of the planning stage. 
If you had ever developed any good piece of software, you'd realize that
bugs *do* happen, no matter how many auditors and other developers peer
review the code, and no matter what other steps you take.  I'm sure Bruce
Schneier could attest to that, unless of course crypto is always perfect
the first time.

Not only has Schneier failed disprove the fact that bugs *are* an
inevitable part of software development, he has proven it himself.  Now, if
Schneier could at least be honest, and not insist that he is perfect (we
all know he's not), this debate would be less about slanted, ridiculous
spin, and more about the realities of software development.

I also ask you to take into account the fact that altering a mindset takes
time.  Security vulnerabilities were all but ignored in the early days of
single-user non-networked Win16.  Those early days are the source of some
of the Win32 message routines implicated in the recent "Shatter" attacks.

Microsoft has had to work against buggy base code, and teams of developers
who were never taught a bit about security.  Essentially, Microsoft is
working against its own history.  For a company of Microsoft's size, this
is not easy.  For all of the work that requires, I'd say that Microsoft is
doing a damn good job.

And, in the meantime, instead of sitting and griping about how terrible
Microsoft's code is, why don't you apply for a position as a project
manager and fix it all?  Oh wait, you wouldn't be able to deal with whiny
sysadmins who never coded "Hello world" griping about your security?  I
understand.  Well, maybe it'll help to remember that you were the same way
once.  Of course, you probably wouldn't even *GET* the position, as
companies usually don't like project managers who sit and gripe all day
long instead of proposing solutions and getting things done.  As for your
clueless ramblings about Microsoft's security practices, keep those to
yourself -- unless of course, you enjoy showing people your complete lack
of knowledge on the subject.

P.S. - Haven't you learned how to trim a message yet, Mr. Dufresne?

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