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Message-ID: <005b01c35681$894dc0d0$2595d882@bzdrnja>
From: Bojan.Zdrnja at LSS.hr (Bojan Zdrnja)
Subject: Avoiding being a good admin - was DCOM RPC exploit (dcom.c)
> -----Original Message-----
> From: full-disclosure-admin@...ts.netsys.com
> [mailto:full-disclosure-admin@...ts.netsys.com] On Behalf Of
> Ron DuFresne
> Sent: Wednesday, 30 July 2003 8:51 a.m.
> To: Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu
> Cc: Jason; full-disclosure@...ts.netsys.com
> Subject: Re: [Full-Disclosure] Avoiding being a good admin -
> was DCOM RPC exploit (dcom.c)
> Still the best defensive porture is taken at the entrance and exit points
> as pertains to most all these 'services'. If the ports 135 and 1433 etc
> are blocked, both tcp and udp protocols, then patching becomes far less
> dramatic, even if a few machines inside get infected due to laptops or
> what have you. when the flow on the wire for a segment
Perimeter blocking is not everything.
It's an important part of your security policy, but I think you're
overstating that.
Is it too difficult to write a worm which will spread through RPC DCOM (this
is just to stay OT) *AND* mass e-mailing. See that? Mass e-mails ... You can
have the best port blocking in the world and still be infected in a second.
The solution for this is long term improvement of security, strong security
policies *AND* education.
Regards,
Bojan Zdrnja
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