full-disclosure - Avoiding being a good admin - was DCOM RPC exploit (dcom.c)

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Message-ID: <001f01c356c1$bfa82310$0100000a@yrpxb5>
From: yossarian at planet.nl (yossarian)
Subject: Avoiding being a good admin - was DCOM RPC
 exploit (dcom.c)

Sorry for being a little late in this discussion - was out there being a
good admin.\

But viz-a-viz cost calculation caused by worm or mass-mail - i remember when
in '97 at a bank I worked at then, people found the Reply All feature in
Exchange client. It took down the network for some 5 hours, and one of the
things that failed was a daily interest payment - some 80 Mo. $ loss - by a
network issue.

That's something else, some companies actually use the computers for
business...
----- Original Message -----
From: "Bojan Zdrnja" <Bojan.Zdrnja@....hr>
To: <full-disclosure@...ts.netsys.com>
Sent: Wednesday, July 30, 2003 12:01 PM
Subject: RE: [Full-Disclosure] Avoiding being a good admin - was DCOM RPC
exploit (dcom.c)


>
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: full-disclosure-admin@...ts.netsys.com
> > [mailto:full-disclosure-admin@...ts.netsys.com] On Behalf Of
> > Ron DuFresne
> > Sent: Wednesday, 30 July 2003 8:51 a.m.
> > To: Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu
> > Cc: Jason; full-disclosure@...ts.netsys.com
> > Subject: Re: [Full-Disclosure] Avoiding being a good admin -
> > was DCOM RPC exploit (dcom.c)
>
> > Still the best defensive porture is taken at the entrance and exit
points
> > as pertains to most all these 'services'.  If the ports 135 and 1433 etc
> > are blocked, both tcp and udp protocols, then patching becomes far less
> > dramatic, even if a few machines inside get infected due to laptops or
> > what have you.  when the flow on the wire for a segment
>
> Perimeter blocking is not everything.
> It's an important part of your security policy, but I think you're
> overstating that.
>
> Is it too difficult to write a worm which will spread through RPC DCOM
(this
> is just to stay OT) *AND* mass e-mailing. See that? Mass e-mails ... You
can
> have the best port blocking in the world and still be infected in a
second.
>
> The solution for this is long term improvement of security, strong
security
> policies *AND* education.
>
> Regards,
>
> Bojan Zdrnja
>
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html