full-disclosure - DCOM/RPC story (Analogy)

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Message-ID: <3F5281CE.2040208@alfray.com>
From: ralfml at alfray.com (Ralf)
Subject: DCOM/RPC story (Analogy)

madsaxon wrote:
> Assuming that he is, in fact, responsible.  If I wanted
> to release a worm and blame someone else for it, the first thing
> I'd do is pick out some basically clueless kiddie who's been

Sure but then why wasn't the original version doing so?
Why limiting the target to one script kiddie and letting him have a 
backdoor control over it?
Why contacting only one IP? Given the expected spread of the worm, 
contacting one sole site would almost be similar to DDoSing yourself in 
the foot.

What you suggest is almost as if someone steals a credit card and order 
stons of stuff online and have it delivered at the card's owner home. 
He/she sure would have a lot of trouble proving the bank it was 
fraudulent, but then why would this be done but by someone who knows and 
hates that person?

Yet it's all right. Tracing the original responsible person/group is 
probably so much trouble that authorities will love having someone easy 
to blame.

R/