full-disclosure - Re: Gaim festival plugin exploit

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From: full-disclosure at ifokr.org (Brian Hatch)
Subject: Re: Gaim festival plugin exploit



> >> system("echo \"$string\" | /usr/bin/festival --tts");
> 
> Replace this with
> 
>         open FEST, "|/usr/bin/festival --tts";
>         print FEST $string, "\n";
>         close FEST;
> 
> No shells involved.  Only DOS exploits and maybe the usual
> C-language overflows in festival itself.

Well, no, that open does invoke a shell, albeit one with
no user input.  It's still better to 

	pipe
	fork
	child exec explicitly
	parent read pipe

Newer perl can actually use list form in the 'file'
section for open, so you'd be able to use that to
avoid a shell in the open without writing the code
yourself.


--
Brian Hatch                  Why do croutons come
   Systems and                in airtight packages?
   Security Engineer          Aren't they just stale
http://www.ifokr.org/bri/     bread to begin with?

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