full-disclosure - defense against session hijacking

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From: frank at knobbe.us (Frank Knobbe)
Subject: defense against session hijacking

On Mon, 2003-11-17 at 16:44, Damian Gerow wrote:
> Thus spake David Maynor (dave@...yspray.com) [17/11/03 17:30]:
> > This would break things like NATed machines and such.
> 
> Could you explain how, please?

I think David was hinting at pooled NAT address. Image an internal
network that gets NATed to addresses a.b.c.d.5 until a.b.c.d.12. Kinda
like Gary's "ganged" proxies.

The debates over using IP addresses, ports, TTLs and other connection
based elements do come up from time to time. However, you are trying to
authenticate/verify the user on the other end, not networking equipment
in between. Logically you should check user elements (such as browser ID
perhaps).

Or wrap it in SSL, use hard to guess/brute session ID's and hope for the
best.... like the rest if us :)

Regards,
Frank

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