full-disclosure - Removing ShKit Root Kit

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Message-ID: <3FE75045.1090005@umn.edu>
From: eckman at umn.edu (Brian Eckman)
Subject: Removing ShKit Root Kit

Schmehl, Paul L wrote:
<snip>
> This advice is common, and it's always mystified me.  Why would you want
> backups of the "data"?  If the box is compromised, you can't trust
> *anything* on it, can you?  How can you know for certain that "data"
> isn't a cleverly concealed backdoor?

Hmmm. Well, if the execute bit isn't set, then I'd assume it can be 
considered relatively safe. If the attacker can later find a way to 
chmod it and then execute it with the privliges needed to make it 
harmful, then I imagine that they could find other ways of compromising 
your machine as well.

For Windows, if it's a backdoor that is named something.txt, well, 
again, the attacker would have to find a way to rename that file and 
execute it with appropriate permissions. Again, I imagine that if they 
can do that, that they could find other ways of compromising your 
machine as well.

<snip>

Brian
-- 
Brian Eckman
Security Analyst
OIT Security and Assurance
University of Minnesota

"There are 10 types of people in this world. Those who
understand binary and those who don't."