full-disclosure - Removing ShKit Root Kit

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From: pauls at utdallas.edu (Schmehl, Paul L)
Subject: Removing ShKit Root Kit

> -----Original Message-----
> From: full-disclosure-admin@...ts.netsys.com 
> [mailto:full-disclosure-admin@...ts.netsys.com] On Behalf Of 
> Alexander Schreiber
> Sent: Monday, December 22, 2003 12:24 AM
> To: Chris
> Cc: full-disclosure@...ts.netsys.com
> Subject: Re: [Full-Disclosure] Removing ShKit Root Kit
> 
> There is exactly one way to properly clean up a rooted box: 
> backup the system (for later analysis and for keeping any 
> data that might be needed), wipe the disks and reinstall from 
> known clean install media, update the system to get all 
> current security updates und properly secure the box.
>
This advice is common, and it's always mystified me.  Why would you want
backups of the "data"?  If the box is compromised, you can't trust
*anything* on it, can you?  How can you know for certain that "data"
isn't a cleverly concealed backdoor?

I can understand backing up the disk for offline analysis, but I would
think you'd want to restore your data from known good copies, wouldn't
you?  And if you don't have known good data backups, well, then consider
it a lesson learned and do it right the next time.

Paul Schmehl (pauls@...allas.edu)
Adjunct Information Security Officer
The University of Texas at Dallas
AVIEN Founding Member
http://www.utdallas.edu/~pauls/