full-disclosure - Re: vulnerabilities of postscript printers

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Message-ID: <200401240146.i0O1k5tN007188@turing-police.cc.vt.edu>
From: Valdis.Kletnieks at vt.edu (Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu)
Subject: Re: vulnerabilities of postscript printers 

On Sat, 24 Jan 2004 00:11:50 +0100, Michael Zimmermann said:

> Security critical networks should not share printers with 
> insecure nets - no physical connection should be there.
> And a PostScript printer is a possible "tunnel" and 
> can even be "owned" - depending on it's hardware
> + software situation.

For that matter, if the printer has a disk, and a "printout" from
the insecure net can get the system password, is it able to scavenge
data from old jobs off the disk?  Most modern multi-user operating
systems manage to do this correctly, but there's still the occasional
screw-up (how many times have we seen "Program XYZ embeds random
data in files" exposures?)
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