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From: stb at (Stefan Bethke)
Subject: Re: Multiple issues with Mac OS X AFP client

Am 04.03.2004 um 04:34 schrieb Marukka:

> Nice find. Most people really shouldn?t be using AFP. I know that 
> Classic
> MacOS machines store the passwords on disk using a simple XOR cipher.

Any local storage of passwords is only as secure as the security of the 
key store.  The lack of sophistication in the password store in many 
AFP clients is well documented; in fact, the AFP server can advise the 
client to not allow storing the password.

> I would assume that they also transmit the password using the same 
> cipher.


An AFP client /may/ transmit authentication information in the clear, 
but for at least ten years, the standard method used was a 
DES-encrypted challenge-response protocol.  I believe a 
challenge-response protocol was the preferred authentication protocol 
from the very start of AFP.

> has a article on this if anyone is interested.

Is that so?  Google didn't seem to find much...

Stefan Bethke <>   Fon +49 170 346 0140

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