lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
From: id3nt at (
Subject: Re: [VulnDiscuss] Re: [VulnWatch] TCP Reset Attacks: Paper and Code Now Availble

Hash: SHA1

Crisco is a marketting machine and nothing more. We spent 12 years supporting
them and at every turn were told lies about the product, new product
and their vaporware. But management was getting huge perks for doing
business with them.

Do a comparison of Crisco and other network vendors on S-Focus for bugs,
 vulns and otherwise lame stuff.

Then, armed with this info, take it to your manager whose getting the
free golf trip to barbados and say, I can't work with this stuff; it's
to buggy.

On Fri, 23 Apr 2004 06:14:53 -0700 Florian Weimer <Weimer@...T.Uni-Stuttgart.DE>
>Kurt Seifried wrote:
>> Please note:
>> According to the Cisco presentation afterwards, Cisco's RST behavior
>> it non vulnerable as there is a wait period after a certain number
>of bad
>> RST packets are recieved. Thus Cisco IOS is basically not affected.
>This is not quite true according to the advisiories.  You flood
>other side with SYN segments (which are NOT rate limited).  Only
>if the
>segment number is acceptable, the other side generates an RST segment
>which tears down the connection.  RST rate limits do NOT help here.
>Even if you drop RST segments completely, the other side probably
>a state transition away from ESTABLISHED so that connection is
>eventually broken (I haven't tested this, but it's required according
>RFC 793).
>The SYN issue is not present in the Watson's paper, by the way.
> I don't
>know how he was able to attack those TCP connections with RST segments.
>Probably he didn't test an IOS-to-IOS TCP connection.
>Florian Weimer 	                  Weimer@...T.Uni-Stuttgart.DE
>University of Stuttgart
>ZENDAS                            fax +49-711-121-3688
>Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Note: This signature can be verified at
Version: Hush 2.4


Concerned about your privacy? Follow this link to get
FREE encrypted email:

Free, ultra-private instant messaging with Hush Messenger

Promote security and make money with the Hushmail Affiliate Program:

Powered by blists - more mailing lists