Message-ID: <9D25EC9CEF02EE449A4D64BFFA413AC87E9915@iu-mssg-mbx05.exchange.iu.edu>
From: edge at indiana.edu (Edge, Ronald D)
Subject: RE:  M$ - so what should they do?

>Message: 1
>From: "joe" <mvp@...ware.net>
>To: <full-disclosure@...ts.netsys.com>
>Subject: RE: [Full-Disclosure] M$ - so what should they do?
>Date: Mon, 21 Jun 2004 12:29:00 -0400
>
>Anything specific?
>
>Obviously this isn't going to happen in the short term and 
>even long term your statement doesn't say the specific issue you feel
is in the "basic
>windows design" that you think is wrong? Is it virtualization 
>of memory? >Support of GUI interfaces? What?
>
>At the very least what is the top hitter you think needs to be 
>addressed in technical specifics not something like IE sucks and which
btw, 
>isn't a basic windows design piece. When I think basic windows design I

>think core pieces, api level and lower, not interfaces that makes your
britches itch.
>
>I ask this because there are a lot of people who go around 
>complaining that Windows Sucks and that it is obvious why yet can't
state one 
>solid concrete thing let alone a solid concrete basic core Windows
thing and 
>how they think it should be redone....
>  joe

I would say let me count the ways, but I do not have time to write a
book.
So a few specifics.

1. Windows was designed form the ground up to be insecure and trusting.
That was the first mistake by its designers. It is almost impossible to
achieve the correct balance of permissions one easily sets up in UNIX or
LINUX, wherein the average users does not run as root, with privileges
adequate to blast the OS to pieces or compromise the machine. Even the
stabs at correcting this since Windows 2000 into XP have been half-assed
and flawed. I can only assure that we have gone through years of pain
trying to configure a workstation for our users that limits their
privileges so that that are not constantly either installing software
themselves, or getting their machines loaded with adware and spyware
until they simply stop function. This is such a familiar phenomenon
anymore I am shocked I have to even explain it to you. So there is a
very specific starting point: to make stuff work, you have to run with
too many privileges, and that is taken advantage of again and again and
again and again by those willing to write code to compromise Windows
machines.

2. MS programmers never met a buffer overrun they did not like. The
point of this little bon mot is that despite all the vaunted PR from M$
about safe computing initiative, the designers of Windows and components
like the browser still clearly know diddly-sqaut about designing
software to prevent casual compromises. The recent spat of absolutely
fatal flaws in IE browser stand as just another in a long chain. Here,
let me quote from an article this week at securityfocus.com, in which
the author advises everyone to as fast as they can tell their
co-workers, friends, and relatives, to quit using IE web browser to
connect to the Internet:

  "I could go on and on. Look, let's be honest with each other. We all
know this is true: IE is a buggy, insecure, dangerous piece of software,
and the source of many of the headaches that security pros have to
endure (I'm not even going to go into its poor support for Web
standards; let that be a rant for another day). Yes, I know Microsoft
patches holes as they are found. Great. But far too many are found. And
yes, I know that Microsoft has promised that it has changed its ways,
and that it will now focus on "Trustworthy Computing." But I've heard
too many of Microsoft's promises and seen the results too many times.
You know, fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me. Who's
shamed when it's "fool me the 432nd time"? Who's the fool? "

http://www.securityfocus.com/columnists/249

3. MS is really responsible for introducing the paradigm that is at the
heart of the problem of machines connected to the Internet, thanks to
their introduction of ActiveX. This turned out to be not a solution to
an interface and proramming problem, but a dagger aimed at local
machines and a key to the machine for everyone on the Internet who wants
to hack a machine. The entire paradigm of trusting remotely introduced
code from a zillion posible places on the Internet to run on your
machine is absolute insanity to begin with, and was the absolute wrong
path to take as the Internet evolved. But it evolved parallel with the
MS model of insecurity being ignored, and user interface and user
friendliness always at the fore, any thoughts of the flawed nature of
the code and insecurities behind the screen being ignored at every step.
As far as I am concerned, no web site or remote connection should be
allowed to execute any code on my machine. Any and everything that can
be done should be done on the server end, and a final static page
delivered to my desktop. Will this mean it is harder to right the kind
of rich GUI interfaces Windows is capable of at the client level? Yes.
Do I care? No. Why do I not care? Because taking the direction we have
taken has turned computing support, use, and the Internet environment
into a living hell of criminal activity and rampant abuse, and made my
job as an administrator in charge of a staff trying to keep operations
running into a constant cycle of attacks and security patches. God
forbid we should find time to actually do anything productive with our
machines. Half our time is spent trying to roll out MS patches to
hundreds of machines, and desparately trying to hide our Windows server
from the leering eyes of crackers who would gladly go for them in a
heartbeat if we let our defenses down for a second.

4. As a final example of what a pain in the ass MS software support can
become, I got a not from a fellow computer support and program designer
this week with his remarks on the coming XP SP2. He said he had found
buried in the notes some remarks to the effect that you better have all
the components you want installed before you install SP2, because after
you install it, you may not be able install them AT ALL. Here was my
replay to that revelation:
  "Ah, a return to the heady days of NT 4.0 post SP4, when you had to
have a bible script that you followed line by line to do a new
installation and get all the components including the web service to
actually WORK, because if you did NOT follow the script carefully,
things would, well, not work."

5. I won't even go into the corporate sins of Microsoft, although a book
could and should be written on that two. They successfully elude
conviction for monopolistic and anti-trust practices, which they should
not have been allowed to do. And know the argument that was at the core
of that case, the embedding of the browser, is obviously moot, since
they have announced it will be, well, embedded in the operating system
in Longhorn.

Ron.

Ronald D. Edge
Director of Information Systems
Indiana University Intercollegiate Athletics
edge@...iana.edu  (812)855-9010
http://iuhoosiers.com

"Patriotism is not short, frenzied outbursts
of emotion, but the tranquil and steady
dedication of a lifetime." - Adlai Stevenson
 

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