Message-ID: <1088018017.4441.12.camel@badeeter>
From: matt.wagenknecht at quantum.com (Matt Wagenknecht)
Subject: CISCO Vpn


a more expensive but more secure (if done right) option would be a
Citrix Secure gateway.. no direct connectivity from the client machine
at all.. 

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Matt Wagenknecht                          CISSP  |  MCSE
Sr. Security Administrator                  
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Never be afraid to try something new.
Remember, amateurs built the ark; professionals built the Titanic.

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On Wed, 2004-06-23 at 12:06, Bryan K. Watson wrote:
> >Patrick Olsen wrote:
> >I have been asked what the PROs and CONs of setting up a vpn would be. 
> >Im trying to find security pros and cons. Basically to find out if it 
> >is worth the risk. This individual would be using a desktop at home 
> >which we would be setting up for her.
> >
> 
> I consider the best practice to be an antivirus firewall like a Fortinet
> Fortigate to either be the VPN tunnel endpoint, or in transparent mode on
> the inside of the network between your Cisco VPN device and the internal
> network.  This way you can enforce additional access controls and stop
> virus/worm/hack activity from getting in or out to your VPN users.  The
> Cisco alone will not stop this mal-activity.
> 
> An option that also provides access without opening up a full network tunnel
> is the use of an SSL application gateway like Array Networks makes or like a
> Neoteris (Netscreen/Juniper now) SSL gateway appliance.  This way you can
> give limited access to client-server applications and not the whole network.
> These devices also do allow you to selectively allow full TCPIP layer 3
> VPN's...then you need to provide protection like I mentioned above.
> 
> Another consideration with IPSEC and PPTP versus SSL VPN's is that IPSEC and
> PPTP will have problems traversing some network firewalls (even old PIX
> versions), and your remote users will keep you on the help-desk phone trying
> to figure out why the VPN doesn't work.  That is because IPSEC and PPTP
> require special firewall rules to allow them to get out of a network.  SSL
> only uses a single outbound channel (typically over port 443/HTTPS) for all
> two way communication of VPN traffic.  Firewalls usually do not complain
> about this unless they have specific traffic inspection policies to shut
> down SSL VPN traffic (Checkpoint can do this).
> 
> If the remote user only needs a couple of apps, figure out a way to limit
> access to only the needed resources or setup a remote access RDP/Terminal
> Server to facilitate secure access.  Also consider that a home system will
> store data locally and will not be under your company backup procedures.  A
> terminal server will be on your local network and you can use you existing
> backup systems to keep your corporate Intellectual Property secure.
> Revocation of a home system in case of employee termination also becomes a
> problem and you are likely to lose IP in such an event with a home system
> with locally stored data.
> 
> And finally, opening up a remote access method of any kind will expose your
> weak password policy to brute forcing. Multi-factor authentication should be
> employed and enforced.  Client system certificates, SecurID and Authenex are
> some ways to do this multifactor authentication.  
> 
> Have fun,
> - Bryan K. Watson
> - bwatson@...tracers.com
> 
> 
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