full-disclosure - Is Mozilla's "patch" enough?

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From: avivra at gmail.com (Aviv Raff)
Subject: Is Mozilla's "patch" enough?

If you don't have anyhing to say but flaming, why do you pollute the list too?

Security patches shouldn't be overridden unless intended too (i.e uninstalled). 
If an attacker can override the patch by a simple line of settings in
a configuration file (aka user.js) and the user cannot change this
settings by simply applying the patch again, or manually changing it
via the about:config interface, it is wrong.
Most of the users don't know how to use the preferences files, or even
know they exist. Moreover, user.js doesn't exist by default.

On Mon, 12 Jul 2004 18:42:07 +0300, Georgi Guninski
<guninski@...inski.com> wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 12, 2004 at 05:23:29PM +0300, Aviv Raff wrote:
> >
> > I understand that if an attacker has the ability to change the user.js
> > file he can do worse things, but why should there be a way to override
> > security patches without uninstalling them?
> >
> 
> if you understand your dumbness why do you continue to polute the list?
> updated builds for the so called "os" are available at mozilla.org - go get
> them.
> there are a lot of ways to override security patches without uninstalling them
> 
> georgi
> 
>