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Message-ID: <d7242632050111101646268bca@mail.gmail.com>
From: jeff.gillian at gmail.com (Jeff Gillian)
Subject: Multi-vendor AV gateway image inspection bypass
vulnerability
Interesting. I tested a number of both Linux and Windows image
vulnerabilities that are all by default detected by my IronPort,
TippingPoint UnityOne and ISS Proventia appliances.
Using the technique you mentioned, they were ignored completely and delivered.
Additionally, there are appear to be several mail clients that support
that RFC, including Thunderbird so you can obviously target more than
just web browsers.
Jeff.
On Mon, 10 Jan 2005 14:08:11 -0500, Darren Bounds
<dbounds@...rusense.com> wrote:
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
>
> Multi-vendor AV gateway image inspection bypass vulnerability
> January 10, 2005
>
> A vulnerability has been discovered which allows a remote attacker to
> bypass anti-virus
> (as well other security technologies such as IDS and IPS) inspection of
> HTTP image content.
>
> By leveraging techniques described in RFC 2397 for base64 encoding
> image content within
> the URL scheme. A remote attack may encode a malicious image within the
> body of an HTML
> formatted document to circumvent content inspection.
>
> For example:
>
> http://www.k-otik.com/exploits/09222004.ms04-28-cmd.c.php
>
> The source code at the URL above will by default create a JPEG image
> that will attempt (and fail
> without tweaking) to exploit the Microsoft MS04-028 GDI+ vulnerability.
> The image itself is detected
> by all AV gateway engines tested (Trend, Sophos and McAfee), however,
> when the same image
> is base64 encoded using the technique described in RFC 2397 (documented
> below), inspection
> is not performed and is delivered rendered by the client.
>
> While Microsoft Internet Explorer does not support the RFC 2397 URL
> scheme; Firefox, Safari,
> Mozilla and Opera do and will render the data and thus successfully
> execute the payload if the necessary
> OS and/or application patches have not been applied.
>
> ## BEGIN HTML ##
>
> <html>
> <body>
> <img
> src="
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> Z">
> </body>
> </html>
>
> ## END HTML ##
>
> Solution:
>
> While AV vendor patches are not yet available, fixes for all currently
> known image vulnerabilities are
> and have been for several months. If you have not yet applied them,
> you have your own
> negligence to blame.
>
> Contributions:
>
> Thanks to Scott Roeder and Jacinto Rodriquez their assistance in
> platform testing.
>
> Thank you,
>
> Darren Bounds
> Intrusense, LLC.
> http://www.intrusense.com
>
> - --
> Intrusense - Securing Business As Usual
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> =82yy
> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
>
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