From: psirt at cisco.com (Cisco Systems Product Security Incident Response Team)
Subject: Cisco Security Advisory: Default SNMP Community
	Strings in Cisco IP/VC Products


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Cisco Security Advisory: Default SNMP Community Strings in Cisco IP/VC
Products

Revision 1.0

For Public Release 2005 February 02 16:00 UTC (GMT)

Summary
=======
Hard-coded Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) community strings
are present in Cisco IP/VC Videoconferencing System models 3510, 3520,
3525 and 3530. Any user who has access to the vulnerable devices and
knows the community strings, can obtain total control of the device.

Cisco strongly recommends that all users deploy the mitigation measures
outlined in the Workaround section.

This advisory is available at 
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20050202-ipvc.shtml.

Affected Products
=================
Vulnerable Products
- -------------------
The following products are known to be vulnerable:
   
   
  * Cisco IPVC-3510-MCU
  * Cisco IPVC-3520-GW-2B
  * Cisco IPVC-3520-GW-4B
  * Cisco IPVC-3520-GW-2V
  * Cisco IPVC-3520-GW-4V
  * Cisco IPVC-3520-GW-2B2V
  * Cisco IPVC-3525-GW-1P
  * Cisco IPVC-3530-VTA
   

Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
- ---------------------------------
The following products are known not to be vulnerable:
   
   
  * Cisco IPVC-3511-MCU
  * Cisco IPVC-3511-MCU-E
  * Cisco IPVC-3521-GW-4B
  * Cisco IPVC-3526-GW-1P
  * Cisco IPVC-3540-EMP
  * Cisco IPVC-3540-EMP3
  * Cisco IPVC-3540-MCU03A
  * Cisco IPVC-3540-MCU06A
  * Cisco IPVC-3540-MCU10A
  * Cisco IPVC-3540-GW2P
  * Cisco IPVC-3540-GW4S
   

No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by this
vulnerability. In particular, video-enabled Cisco IP video telephones
are not affected.

Details
=======
Affected products contain hard-coded SNMP community strings. SNMP is
used for managing and monitoring an IP/VC device and community strings
are the equivalent to a password. All models listed as affected are
vulnerable regardless of the software release they are running.

There is no Cisco bug ID associated with this issue.

Impact
======
A user with knowledge of the community strings can gain full control of
the device. Such user can, among other things, create new services,
terminate or affect existing sessions, and redirect traffic to a
different destination.

Software Versions and Fixes
===========================
Cisco will not provide fixed software for this vulnerability. Customers
are strongly advised to deploy the mitigation measures described in the 
Workaround section.

Obtaining Fixed Software
========================
There is no fixed software for this issue. All customers are strongly
advised to deploy the mitigation measures. Additionally, customers who
are considering replacing the affected models can contact their Cisco
sales representative.

If you need assistance with the implementation of the workarounds, or
have questions on the workarounds, please contact the Cisco Technical
Assistance Center (TAC).
   
   
  * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
  * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
  * e-mail: tac@...co.com
   

See http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml for
additional TAC contact information, including special localized
telephone numbers and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in
various languages.

Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they
have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using
such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of
Cisco's software license terms found at 
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-license-agreement.html, or as otherwise 
set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at 
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml.

Workarounds
===========
The only mitigation for this vulnerability is to disable SNMP traffic at
the switch port that is connected to the affected device. If that cannot
be done, the SNMP traffic to the IP/VC device should be blocked at the
nearest possible point. In order for the mitigation to be successful all
possible paths to the device must be protected. This can be done by
blocking traffic on UDP (User Datagram Protocol) ports 161 and 162. Port
161 is used for inbound/outbound read/write SNMP access and port 162 is
used for outbound traffic for SNMP traps. Blocking these ports disables
all configuration and traps to/from the device. Access to ports 161 and
162 from the trusted hosts should be temporarily enabled and the IPVC
Configuration Utility used when configuration changes are required on
the affected IP/VC device.

The effectiveness of any workaround is dependent on specific customer
situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and
organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and
releases, customers should consult with their service provider or
support organization to ensure any applied workaround is the most
appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed.

Exploitation and Public Announcements
=====================================
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious
use of the vulnerability described in this advisory.

Status of This Notice: FINAL
============================
THIS ADVISORY IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY
KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTY OF
MERCHANTABILITY. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE ADVISORY OR
MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE ADVISORY IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES
THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS NOTICE AT ANY TIME.

A stand-alone copy or paraphrase of the text of this security advisory
that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an
uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual
errors.

Distribution
============
This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at 
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20050202-ipvc.shtml.

In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is
clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following
e-mail and Usenet news recipients.
   
   
  * cust-security-announce@...co.com
  * first-teams@...st.org (includes CERT/CC)
  * bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
  * vulnwatch@...nwatch.org
  * cisco@...t.colorado.edu
  * cisco-nsp@...k.nether.net
  * full-disclosure@...ts.netsys.com
  * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@...sgate.cisco.com
   

Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing
lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged
to check the above URL for any updates.

Revision History
================
+--------------+------------------+------------------------+
| Revision 1.0 | 2005-February-02 | Initial public release |
+--------------+------------------+------------------------+

Cisco Security Procedures
=========================
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco
products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering
to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's
worldwide website at 
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/sec_incident_response.shtml. 
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security 
notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at 
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.

- ------------------------------------------------------------------------
All contents are Copyright © 1992-2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights
reserved. Important Notices and Privacy Statement.
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